Thursday, June 30, 2005

Where'd the short interest go?

From mid 2001 through much of 2003, the short interest in REFR was a very large, albeit rather stable, two million shares. (For no apparent reason, promoters at the time chose to make up their own number, insisting that there was an additional half million "invisible" short interest. Today these same people will latch on to any excuse to declare the critics to be liars. Go figure.)

In theory, this represented a potential powderkeg for the shorts. If REFR were to suddenly achieve the success that had eluded them for decades, the wave of resulting buying from the short covering alone would lead to huge run-ups in the stock. But then again, we're talking REFR, so shorts were rightly unworried about that eventuality.

Nevertheless, the promoters were unperturbed that, as delay built upon delay, a golden opportunity to catch the shorts off-guard might be slipping away. Why? Because, they said, the short interest wasn't going anywhere. There was no way for the shorts to cover their positions.

It's unclear how they arrived at that conclusion, given that the claim was more sloganeering than debate. But whatever the thought process was, the shareholders were completely convinced. The shorts can't cover and that was all that needs to be said. If REFR took a month, or a year, or ten years to finally succeed, it wouldn't matter because the short interest would still be stuck where it was, waiting to be squeezed to infinity and beyond.

Today the short interest holds steady, at a bit less than one million shares.

Since we'll never get a mea culpa or other explanation from the promoters regarding how they wound up being so wrong about so many things (they're too busy asserting how they will eventually be proven right -- yeah, I know) it falls to the rest of us to piece together what happened.

Two major events appear to have made the difference. The first and easiest one was REFR's delisting from the Russell index. Index funds dumped over half a million shares, and while this weighed heavily on the stock, the stock never quite "broke". It was by and large an orderly decline, with trading volumes increasing nicely to accomodate the mandatory selling by the funds. Where were all these buyers coming from to cushion the fall? It was the short sellers, of course, capturing very nice profits from shares shorted from anywhere from $12 to more than $30.

But prior to that came a rather mysterious occurrence. During one relatively uneventful month, the short interest dropped by more than half a million shares between two reporting periods. There had been a small rise during the period in question, but one that soon fell back, and in any event there was hardly enough volume for that many shares to have been covered in the open market.

So what happened there? Apparently some entity or other had a very large "boxed" position, one hedged against a long position or something equivalent. In the most common cases, such hedging involves options, or shares of a company the shorted company is acquiring, but neither of those applies to REFR.

We may, in fact, never know exactly what happened, but some have strong suspicions. One involves REFR's financier of the time, Ailouros Ltd. While they were supposedly barred from shorting REFR stock in their agreement, it always felt odd that they seemingly had no problem with REFR continuously selling them shares even as they continued to fall. In a few cases, REFR was rather embarassingly found to have been buying the shares right back from Ailouros, at a loss to REFR. But it never seemed right that Ailouros would continue on as they had without some kind of ace in the hole. Could a short position of over half a million shares have been that ace?

Regardless, the shorts today are manifestly in superlative shape, with a relatively mild million shares to worry about covering, and with the stock hovering around 14-year lows. Those still long remain defiant, insisting that one day the shorts will get theirs.

From here, though, it looks like they already did.

No comments: