The mystery of the Boeing 787 dimmable windows is over. The funny thing is, everybody was wrong. But it is the shareholders of REFR that wind up with coal in their stock(ings), as ever.
Neither Jamco, nor the University of Washington, nor REFR will be seeing their product take flight on the windows of the Dreamliner. Rather, PPG Aerospace has been selected to provide the windows, much as they have provided windows for prior incarnations of the 7x7 aircraft series.
No doubt, supporters of REFR are working on some way in which REFR might somehow get in on the action, but, given that PPG surely has demonstrated the technology they will use, and that they are most definitely not one of REFR's licensees, it appears that this avenue of promotion for REFR is once and for all time closed.
Thursday, December 15, 2005
Sunday, November 27, 2005
Reaching new pinnacles
I know I haven't been here to update in a while, but frankly, there hasn't been a whole heck of a lot going on with REFR lately, despite what the recent surge in its share price to near $7 might suggest. There is one development of some interest, though, involving REFR's latest effort at a pilot project for SPD.
The Church at Pinnacle Hills of Rogers, Arkansas, up in the Ozarks of northwestern Arkansas, is in the process of building a grand new worship center. It's a pretty big deal in that region, and very much a 21st century project. There are even webcams that allow you to view the progress of construction.
REFR's interest in this project is revealed through contractor Brawner and Associates. The large window facing the main worship center is expected to have "smart glass" in order to control the level of light. An article (PDF) included on Brawner's website goes on to state that technology used in the "smart glass" will be SPD.
Assuming nothing changes (and naturally, the message board mavens are assuming exactly that), it will be a nice feather in REFR's cap. Relatively speaking, of course. In the bigger picture, needless to say, they remain a public company dealing in terms of individual, one-shot projects, which, any way you cut it, is far from a truly desirable state of affairs.
Still, it will be interesting to watch and see how this develops. Will SPD remain the technology of choice for this project? Will film of adequate quality be available? Will the price tag be reasonable? Will REFR step in to make it reasonable? So many questions for a company so reticent in providing answers. But maybe we'll get them this time.
The Church at Pinnacle Hills of Rogers, Arkansas, up in the Ozarks of northwestern Arkansas, is in the process of building a grand new worship center. It's a pretty big deal in that region, and very much a 21st century project. There are even webcams that allow you to view the progress of construction.
REFR's interest in this project is revealed through contractor Brawner and Associates. The large window facing the main worship center is expected to have "smart glass" in order to control the level of light. An article (PDF) included on Brawner's website goes on to state that technology used in the "smart glass" will be SPD.
Assuming nothing changes (and naturally, the message board mavens are assuming exactly that), it will be a nice feather in REFR's cap. Relatively speaking, of course. In the bigger picture, needless to say, they remain a public company dealing in terms of individual, one-shot projects, which, any way you cut it, is far from a truly desirable state of affairs.
Still, it will be interesting to watch and see how this develops. Will SPD remain the technology of choice for this project? Will film of adequate quality be available? Will the price tag be reasonable? Will REFR step in to make it reasonable? So many questions for a company so reticent in providing answers. But maybe we'll get them this time.
Thursday, October 27, 2005
All hail SPD (insert rest of company name here)!
In a sign that REFR is not yet willing to depart from its old reliable SOP, the company announced the signing up of a brand-new licensee. The new company, SPD Control Systems, is so far basically indistinguishable from every other REFR licensee whose name begins with "SPD".
SCSC's chairman and founder, Jay Moskowitz, does have the distinction of actually having a track record as a businessman. However, his most recent company, Wireless Marvels, appears to have gone nowhere after producing its only material product a combination golf ball/FM radio. (Not kidding.) His biggest success story, per his bio, appears to have been selling his RTS Wireless company for a healthy $111 million. Not too bad, but one has to keep in mind that valuation dates to 2000, when company values were just a wee bit inflated. Not to mention that the acquiring company, Aether Systems, went into a bit of a nosedive shortly thereafter, and has since abandoned the wireless sector entirely. (Yes, it is the same company, see Aether Holdings' Yahoo profile.)
All in all, Moskowitz seems to fit the profile of a prospective REFR licensee, as in, being willing to try just about anything once. With the kind of money he has in the bank, he can no doubt well afford to have whatever he puts into this come to nothing. If only the REFR investors who giddily bought up shares during the recent rally could say the same.
SCSC's chairman and founder, Jay Moskowitz, does have the distinction of actually having a track record as a businessman. However, his most recent company, Wireless Marvels, appears to have gone nowhere after producing its only material product a combination golf ball/FM radio. (Not kidding.) His biggest success story, per his bio, appears to have been selling his RTS Wireless company for a healthy $111 million. Not too bad, but one has to keep in mind that valuation dates to 2000, when company values were just a wee bit inflated. Not to mention that the acquiring company, Aether Systems, went into a bit of a nosedive shortly thereafter, and has since abandoned the wireless sector entirely. (Yes, it is the same company, see Aether Holdings' Yahoo profile.)
All in all, Moskowitz seems to fit the profile of a prospective REFR licensee, as in, being willing to try just about anything once. With the kind of money he has in the bank, he can no doubt well afford to have whatever he puts into this come to nothing. If only the REFR investors who giddily bought up shares during the recent rally could say the same.
Tuesday, October 11, 2005
Boeing, Boeing, gone
After literally years of demands from REFR promoters that any viable alternative to SPD that could be used in Boeing's Dreamliner's advertised smart window shading system, they have finally gotten what they "wanted" as the technology supplier for the 787 window shades has at long last stepped forward.
In the October newsletter of the University of Washington's college of engineering, it was announced that a chemical-reaction based technology called "redox switching" developed at the college's Center for Intelligent Materials and Systems was to be the active technology in the windows' ability to become gradually more transparent or opaque at the touch of a button.
While reaction from promoters is still pending as of this writing, it seems that this is the final proof that Inspectech and SPD are not going to be suppliers for the Boeing 787, despite the bulls' previous insistence that Boeing had no feasible alternative to use.
Perhaps most troubling of all to REFR shareholders: the developers of redox switching indicated ambitions far beyond the aeronautical sector in the UWash newsletter article. Dr. Minoru Taya, directory of the CIMS, indicated commercialization was likely to begin within a few months. That right there puts it right about level with the claimed progress of SPD, with the main difference being that Taya's group does not have a multiple-decade track record of miserably failing expectations.
(Update, 7:18PM: REFR bulls did come back with a pretty fair rejoinder, in that the UWash article does not appear to square with Klaus Brauer's earlier descriptions of where the 787's window technology had been used earlier. Regardless, this still appears to be quite unwelcome competition for the gang from Woodbury.)
In the October newsletter of the University of Washington's college of engineering, it was announced that a chemical-reaction based technology called "redox switching" developed at the college's Center for Intelligent Materials and Systems was to be the active technology in the windows' ability to become gradually more transparent or opaque at the touch of a button.
While reaction from promoters is still pending as of this writing, it seems that this is the final proof that Inspectech and SPD are not going to be suppliers for the Boeing 787, despite the bulls' previous insistence that Boeing had no feasible alternative to use.
Perhaps most troubling of all to REFR shareholders: the developers of redox switching indicated ambitions far beyond the aeronautical sector in the UWash newsletter article. Dr. Minoru Taya, directory of the CIMS, indicated commercialization was likely to begin within a few months. That right there puts it right about level with the claimed progress of SPD, with the main difference being that Taya's group does not have a multiple-decade track record of miserably failing expectations.
(Update, 7:18PM: REFR bulls did come back with a pretty fair rejoinder, in that the UWash article does not appear to square with Klaus Brauer's earlier descriptions of where the 787's window technology had been used earlier. Regardless, this still appears to be quite unwelcome competition for the gang from Woodbury.)
Friday, October 07, 2005
What the H?
(This post originally stated in error that Isoclima's Chromalite trademark was registered. It is in fact not, a trait common to many if not most or all trademarks related to SPD.)
A rather amusing sidelight has arisen from Monday's "blockbuster" Isoclima/REFR press release. In the main text of the release, Isoclima General Director Alberto Bertolini talked about REFR's SPD-Smart Glass, "which we market under the trademark ChromaLite(TM)." However, at the end of the press release, the disclaimer reads: "CromaLite(TM) is a trademark of Isoclima S.p.A."
Okay, you say, so somebody made a typo, so what. Admittedly, not a whole lot but... what is the correct spelling of Isoclima's trademark? If one went to the Isoclima website, one might come across their R&D page, which includes a picture of a "test on electrochromic CromaLite® glass". But if one looked up REFR's most recent 10-K, one would find in the licensee trademark list (about five screenfuls down) that Isoclima's trademark name is given as "ChromaLite".
Now, maybe it's just me, but if I had this product which was supposed to be busting into this brand-new, multi-billion-dollar market for switchable glass, I'd think I'd make sure I knew how to spell my product's name. It certainly does leave one to wonder just how much thought Isoclima is really putting behind this whole marketing campaign.
Regardless, as the Vitrium show closes and REFR stock slips back in the direction from whence it came, leaving behind a brand new group of bagholders in the hole on their purchases of this stock, the fact that the press release that triggered their purchases at $4.70 and above contained such a basic error simply adds the insult to the injury.
A rather amusing sidelight has arisen from Monday's "blockbuster" Isoclima/REFR press release. In the main text of the release, Isoclima General Director Alberto Bertolini talked about REFR's SPD-Smart Glass, "which we market under the trademark ChromaLite(TM)." However, at the end of the press release, the disclaimer reads: "CromaLite(TM) is a trademark of Isoclima S.p.A."
Okay, you say, so somebody made a typo, so what. Admittedly, not a whole lot but... what is the correct spelling of Isoclima's trademark? If one went to the Isoclima website, one might come across their R&D page, which includes a picture of a "test on electrochromic CromaLite® glass". But if one looked up REFR's most recent 10-K, one would find in the licensee trademark list (about five screenfuls down) that Isoclima's trademark name is given as "ChromaLite".
Now, maybe it's just me, but if I had this product which was supposed to be busting into this brand-new, multi-billion-dollar market for switchable glass, I'd think I'd make sure I knew how to spell my product's name. It certainly does leave one to wonder just how much thought Isoclima is really putting behind this whole marketing campaign.
Regardless, as the Vitrium show closes and REFR stock slips back in the direction from whence it came, leaving behind a brand new group of bagholders in the hole on their purchases of this stock, the fact that the press release that triggered their purchases at $4.70 and above contained such a basic error simply adds the insult to the injury.
Monday, October 03, 2005
The great debut
Good morning!
The Red Sox are in the playoffs, Bush has made a new Supreme Court nomination, but who cares about any of that because ISOCLIMA IS SHOWING GEN 2 SPD AT A TRADE SHOW IN MILAN!!!!!!!!!!!!!
At least that seems to be the proportion of reaction as REFR, in the $2's last week, soars over $5 (though perhaps only momentarily) this morning.
To be sure, there's some big-sounding talk in the release. Isoclima "plans" to introduce films more than four feet in width into the market. Isoclima is "working with" companies in the automotive industry. The film was "produced on large-scale equipment", though whether the equipment was actually used for large-scale production is another matter.
One thing shareholders can be legitimately heartened by is, at least REFR has not yet given up entirely. Now, whether this is a last gasp and last chance to get out, or REFR has more aces up its sleeve, remains to be seen.
One thing seems clear from the level at which the stock momentum washed out: at least one shareholder appears to be selling first and asking questions later.
Strap in. This may get good.
The Red Sox are in the playoffs, Bush has made a new Supreme Court nomination, but who cares about any of that because ISOCLIMA IS SHOWING GEN 2 SPD AT A TRADE SHOW IN MILAN!!!!!!!!!!!!!
At least that seems to be the proportion of reaction as REFR, in the $2's last week, soars over $5 (though perhaps only momentarily) this morning.
To be sure, there's some big-sounding talk in the release. Isoclima "plans" to introduce films more than four feet in width into the market. Isoclima is "working with" companies in the automotive industry. The film was "produced on large-scale equipment", though whether the equipment was actually used for large-scale production is another matter.
One thing shareholders can be legitimately heartened by is, at least REFR has not yet given up entirely. Now, whether this is a last gasp and last chance to get out, or REFR has more aces up its sleeve, remains to be seen.
One thing seems clear from the level at which the stock momentum washed out: at least one shareholder appears to be selling first and asking questions later.
Strap in. This may get good.
Wednesday, September 28, 2005
Thermo goes cold
Yes, I know I said I would discuss REFR's presentation at the Long Island Investor's Conference last week, but frankly, no one I've talked to has had anything to say about it, and I haven't gotten around to listening to it for myself. Whatever they said seems to have attracted some tepid interest based on the subsequent price action, but with Stark Investments sitting there taking whatever they can get for their mountain of shares, this thing is not going anywhere fast anyway.
But meanwhile, one of REFR's more infamous cohorts, Thermoview Industries, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy earlier this week. Thermoview was the architect of the "rollout" in 2002 into which REFR founder Bob Saxe sold a significant chunk of stock. To this day Thermoview carries a link to a page describing "AlterLite" windows based on SPD, but apparently sales from that miracle product weren't enough to turn the tide for the struggling home improvement company.
This, coupled with Infinitint (f/k/a Razor's Edge and SPD Technologies) appearing to have repackaged itself once again, this time as PrivaSee Glass, selling a decidedly non-SPD-based product, and the decline of the REFR "empire" is becoming more and more evident by the day.
But meanwhile, one of REFR's more infamous cohorts, Thermoview Industries, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy earlier this week. Thermoview was the architect of the "rollout" in 2002 into which REFR founder Bob Saxe sold a significant chunk of stock. To this day Thermoview carries a link to a page describing "AlterLite" windows based on SPD, but apparently sales from that miracle product weren't enough to turn the tide for the struggling home improvement company.
This, coupled with Infinitint (f/k/a Razor's Edge and SPD Technologies) appearing to have repackaged itself once again, this time as PrivaSee Glass, selling a decidedly non-SPD-based product, and the decline of the REFR "empire" is becoming more and more evident by the day.
Thursday, September 15, 2005
Get thee to the small cappery!
In a rather unexpectedly swift rendering of judgment, the NASD has denied REFR's appeal of its delisting from the Nasdaq National Market to the Nasdaq Small Cap exchange, less than four weeks after the company announced the filing of its appeal.
In past years, the delisting process would often take months. One possible explanation is that the NASD has suddenly gotten much more efficient. This is a little iffy, but strictly speaking, the NASD is not a governmental body, so it's just barely possible that they've allowed some efficiency improvements to creep into their system.
Regardless, there seems little scope for there to have been a great deal of deliberation over this appeal. Was it that REFR's case for continued listing was so weak that it got laughed out of the room? Or did they not even try to make a case, but rather simply filed an empty appeal as a naked attempt to stall for time. If the latter, it doesn't seem to have worked very well.
This comes at an inconvenient moment for REFR, what with their plans to make their pitch to the Long Island Investor's Conference next week. The distinction between National Market and Small Cap may be all but transparent these days, but it will still be one more embarassing issue, out of an extremely long string of them, Joe Harary may have to contend with. Assuming he even opens the floor to questions.
But at any rate, that's for next week. REFR has promised the whole thing will be recorded and kept for posterity's sake, so stay tuned. We may actually have something to talk about again!
In past years, the delisting process would often take months. One possible explanation is that the NASD has suddenly gotten much more efficient. This is a little iffy, but strictly speaking, the NASD is not a governmental body, so it's just barely possible that they've allowed some efficiency improvements to creep into their system.
Regardless, there seems little scope for there to have been a great deal of deliberation over this appeal. Was it that REFR's case for continued listing was so weak that it got laughed out of the room? Or did they not even try to make a case, but rather simply filed an empty appeal as a naked attempt to stall for time. If the latter, it doesn't seem to have worked very well.
This comes at an inconvenient moment for REFR, what with their plans to make their pitch to the Long Island Investor's Conference next week. The distinction between National Market and Small Cap may be all but transparent these days, but it will still be one more embarassing issue, out of an extremely long string of them, Joe Harary may have to contend with. Assuming he even opens the floor to questions.
But at any rate, that's for next week. REFR has promised the whole thing will be recorded and kept for posterity's sake, so stay tuned. We may actually have something to talk about again!
Thursday, August 11, 2005
R&DD
The latest REFR gambit being flogged on the boards stems from an article in the Billings (Mont.) Gazette regarding Volkswagen's research and development work on SPD shading in windows. The article references an experimental Touraeg... Torueag... Toerag... that new SUV model, with windows that can change from a clear state to a dark state yada yada yada we've heard all this before.
Oh, and someone found a video which mentions just about everything the VW research center is working on, including, if you sit through enough of it (I had to resist the urge to click the back button when the Segways showed up), the switchable windows.
Okay, first of all... Billings, Montana? As best as we can tell, this appears to be the only newspaper in the country to pick up this story. Can it be that the rest of the country has already been saturated with "first impressions" of SPD?
Secondly, this represents no advancement at all for SPD. The big Setra rollout that ultimately went nowhere for REFR and SPD Inc. is several steps down the road from where SPD is with Volkswagen. Even if this was destined to be SPD's long-awaited big breakthrough, it's several years and at least one significantly dilutive refinancing away from bearing fruit from REFR.
But none of this matters to the people that uncovered this little nugget. It's become clear that finding "something new" has become its own reward, and that actually evaluating the information is something best left to the pedants.
That is what passes for "due diligence" these days.
Oh, and someone found a video which mentions just about everything the VW research center is working on, including, if you sit through enough of it (I had to resist the urge to click the back button when the Segways showed up), the switchable windows.
Okay, first of all... Billings, Montana? As best as we can tell, this appears to be the only newspaper in the country to pick up this story. Can it be that the rest of the country has already been saturated with "first impressions" of SPD?
Secondly, this represents no advancement at all for SPD. The big Setra rollout that ultimately went nowhere for REFR and SPD Inc. is several steps down the road from where SPD is with Volkswagen. Even if this was destined to be SPD's long-awaited big breakthrough, it's several years and at least one significantly dilutive refinancing away from bearing fruit from REFR.
But none of this matters to the people that uncovered this little nugget. It's become clear that finding "something new" has become its own reward, and that actually evaluating the information is something best left to the pedants.
That is what passes for "due diligence" these days.
Wednesday, August 10, 2005
The receivables conundrum
My general disinterest in REFR's most recent quarterly report notwithstanding, one item of interest has come to light, even if it more of a curiosity than anything else.
For the first half of 2005, REFR has recorded revenue of $78,242. Over the same six months, REFR's accounts ("royalty") receivable has increased by $110,750. Now, for those not familiar with accounting practices, receivables are money the company has earned but not yet been paid. They are recorded as revenue, but are carried as a non-cash asset on the balance sheet.
But if receivables have increased by over $110,750, how is it that there isn't at least that much in revenues? Did REFR somehow have negative payments from its customers?
The answer appears to be in the "deferred revenues" line of the balance sheet. In the past six months, deferred revenues have jumped from $10,000 to $90,000. Deferred revenues are, in a way, the opposite of receivables, in that they represent money paid to REFR but not yet earned by the company. So, reducing the increase in receivables by the increase in deferred revenues, the increase in receivables drops to $30,750, which is at least within the realm of mathematical possibility.
Mind you, it is widely considered a red flag by company watchers when receivables increase faster than revenues. Of course, in REFR's case, revenues aren't increasing anyway. Besides, what is one more red flag among in a company with so many you'd think it was the Chinese embassy?
For the first half of 2005, REFR has recorded revenue of $78,242. Over the same six months, REFR's accounts ("royalty") receivable has increased by $110,750. Now, for those not familiar with accounting practices, receivables are money the company has earned but not yet been paid. They are recorded as revenue, but are carried as a non-cash asset on the balance sheet.
But if receivables have increased by over $110,750, how is it that there isn't at least that much in revenues? Did REFR somehow have negative payments from its customers?
The answer appears to be in the "deferred revenues" line of the balance sheet. In the past six months, deferred revenues have jumped from $10,000 to $90,000. Deferred revenues are, in a way, the opposite of receivables, in that they represent money paid to REFR but not yet earned by the company. So, reducing the increase in receivables by the increase in deferred revenues, the increase in receivables drops to $30,750, which is at least within the realm of mathematical possibility.
Mind you, it is widely considered a red flag by company watchers when receivables increase faster than revenues. Of course, in REFR's case, revenues aren't increasing anyway. Besides, what is one more red flag among in a company with so many you'd think it was the Chinese embassy?
Monday, August 08, 2005
Giving shareholders no quarter
With the release of second quarter results (via 10-Q, as per usual), REFR has given shareholders a good idea of just what it intends to do with the $5 million dollars it raised last February.
That is to say, they intend to continue their policy of collecting paychecks, as SPD technology collects dust, while making a handful of purchases of stock just to give the marks a cue to follow.
Second quarter revenues of $36,992 are down from the same quarter last year, while the net loss is lower due to a cut in "research and development" expenditures. But who cares. Bottom line, another million in cash was burned, give or take a hundred thousand, leaving them with a bit over five quarters' cash left (as of June 30th). Meaning, the proxy to increase the share authorization by another couple million (because just one million shares at this price level will be a waste of time) should show up just about any time now.
Really, the biggest accomplishment for the quarter was a 30% decline in the share price, to multi-year lows. And even then, the legwork on that was accomplished the quarter before (in the form of the issuing of the shares for the aforementioned fundraising).
Move along, there's nothing to see here.
That is to say, they intend to continue their policy of collecting paychecks, as SPD technology collects dust, while making a handful of purchases of stock just to give the marks a cue to follow.
Second quarter revenues of $36,992 are down from the same quarter last year, while the net loss is lower due to a cut in "research and development" expenditures. But who cares. Bottom line, another million in cash was burned, give or take a hundred thousand, leaving them with a bit over five quarters' cash left (as of June 30th). Meaning, the proxy to increase the share authorization by another couple million (because just one million shares at this price level will be a waste of time) should show up just about any time now.
Really, the biggest accomplishment for the quarter was a 30% decline in the share price, to multi-year lows. And even then, the legwork on that was accomplished the quarter before (in the form of the issuing of the shares for the aforementioned fundraising).
Move along, there's nothing to see here.
Monday, August 01, 2005
The Jamco Email
I have to hand it to the REFR promoters; they never stop trying. Last week one of them produced evidence which they say proves that JAMCO cannot possibly be behind the windows of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.
The evidence comes in the form of an email exchange which went as follows:
But then, what does this mean for REFR? Good question. To answer that, you have to go back to the chain of reasoning the promoters are using.
To listen to the promoters' own arguments, the case that SPD is the technology of choice is not based on any positive evidence directly implicating REFR or, their (only?) licensee in the aeronautical industry, Inspectech, but rather the lack of evidence implicating anything else. No, seriously. The primary argument leading to the conclusion that SPD is Boeing's technology of choice begins with the question, "what other commercially available technology could it possibly be?" This is followed by a flat dismissal of the numerous answers to that question, and eventually winds up with a conclusion that SPD is Boeing's choice by default.
In effect, because it cannot at this time be proven that the Boeing 787 windows are something else, REFR longs are supposed to assume that they will be SPD.
One might think that another multi-year low this morning might jolt a few of them out of the complacency of that line of "reasoning". One would be wrong.
The evidence comes in the form of an email exchange which went as follows:
Dear Sir or Madam:Now, this email may or may not be valid, but then again, that sort of uncertainty can be laid upon nearly anything posted to the message boards. So for now, we'll give the poster the benefit of the doubt.
The specifications for the new Boeing 787 call for the passengers and crew to
adjust the transparency of the windows electronically.
Does Jamco manufacture a variable tinting window product for aircraft
that Boeing could use?
Thank you for your attention.
XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
------------------------------------------
Dear Sir,
First of all, we are sorry for late response.
In regards to the your inquiry, JAMCO does not have such product, which can be used
on window, in our current product.
With best regards,
Tsutomu Tadokoro
Manager, Marketing & Sales
JAMCO Corporation, Aircraft Interiors Company
But then, what does this mean for REFR? Good question. To answer that, you have to go back to the chain of reasoning the promoters are using.
To listen to the promoters' own arguments, the case that SPD is the technology of choice is not based on any positive evidence directly implicating REFR or, their (only?) licensee in the aeronautical industry, Inspectech, but rather the lack of evidence implicating anything else. No, seriously. The primary argument leading to the conclusion that SPD is Boeing's technology of choice begins with the question, "what other commercially available technology could it possibly be?" This is followed by a flat dismissal of the numerous answers to that question, and eventually winds up with a conclusion that SPD is Boeing's choice by default.
In effect, because it cannot at this time be proven that the Boeing 787 windows are something else, REFR longs are supposed to assume that they will be SPD.
One might think that another multi-year low this morning might jolt a few of them out of the complacency of that line of "reasoning". One would be wrong.
Friday, July 22, 2005
Time's up
Just felt like making a couple notes. Today is the 10th day before the August 4th deadline for REFR to avoid removal from the NASDAQ-NM to the NASDAQ-SC, so if REFR does not close at $3.62 or higher today, the delisting will go forward. Unless of course they'd like to waste time and effort (whose, exactly, is not clear) appealing the matter.
In other news, let's review the announcement scorecard. Well, at least it's low-maintenance.
Over on the message boards, scandal is hot and heavy as the promoters are demanding to know what the critics theorized about Lang and Inspectech and when they theorized it. The point being, I guess, is if they can catech them wrong enough times about details regarding Inspectech, that will suddenly transform Inspectech into an entity worthy of doing business with Boeing. Or something.
Hey, cut them some slack, it's not easy making a bullish case for this company anymore. Just think if they didn't have the Internet as a buffer and had to vocalize these opinions, and keep a straight face in the process!
In other news, let's review the announcement scorecard. Well, at least it's low-maintenance.
Over on the message boards, scandal is hot and heavy as the promoters are demanding to know what the critics theorized about Lang and Inspectech and when they theorized it. The point being, I guess, is if they can catech them wrong enough times about details regarding Inspectech, that will suddenly transform Inspectech into an entity worthy of doing business with Boeing. Or something.
Hey, cut them some slack, it's not easy making a bullish case for this company anymore. Just think if they didn't have the Internet as a buffer and had to vocalize these opinions, and keep a straight face in the process!
Monday, July 18, 2005
Getting testy
Even as REFR dips again towards $3.00 this morning, many longs remain confident. You might ask why, though if you're a regular reader of this blog you probably have a pretty good idea already.
Nevertheless, it's always "something", and in this case it's the "fact" that all they have to do get is through product testing, and then the licensees will announce film availability, and then products will become available, and then look out world. Or something like that.
Reports on the state of testing are secondhand at best, but the consensus is that while each of the production licensees is working on some sort of problem, no two licensees are experiencing the same problems.
The question is, is that a good thing for REFR, or a bad thing?
It's easy to think it could be good. After all, if no two licensees are having the same problems, then every problem is solved at every licensee but one. So, all that has to happen is to have the licensees get together and they'll easily have the solutions to all the problems between them.
But is it really that simple?
Talk to anyone who's ever worked in quality control, or anyone who's managed to stay awake through one of those training films on the topic of quality, and they'll emphatically answer that question "no".
To cover one obvious possibility, a fix for one problem has this tendency to cause other problems. If one licensee were to apply another licensee's "fix" for their problem, there's every reason to think that "fix" would cause the problems the other licensee was having.
But beyond that lies another annoying question. Why is it that no two licensees can replicate the same results? Are they not following the same process for producing film? Is there a fixed process for producing film? If not, why not? And furthermore, if not, how exactly are the licensees ever supposed to get on the "same page", when they're reading from different scripts, so to speak?
REFR likens its business model to that of Qualcomm, the company that owns the CDMA standard for cell phones. But Qualcomm got where they are today by actually spelling out that standard very specifically, and making sure anyone who licensed the technology followed the standard to the letter. There is no indication REFR is making any effort to do that at all, which, given their minimalist approach to the licensing model, should come as no surprise.
This is a recipe for chaos. Film that Hitachi produces may be entirely different from film that produced by Air Products, or DuPont, or Dainippon. And in the event any one of them hits upon a winning formula, are they going to be eager to share it with their competitors? Doubtful!
One promoter on the message boards is trying to get over the catchphrase, "I would not bet against Hitachi". (At least it's a step up from "Bang! Bang!" -- was this supposed to be investing or wrestling?) But by betting on Hitachi, are you also betting on Air Products, DuPont and Dainippon... or against them?
Besides which, I'll bet against anyone I damn well please, if I don't think they care about "winning".
Nevertheless, it's always "something", and in this case it's the "fact" that all they have to do get is through product testing, and then the licensees will announce film availability, and then products will become available, and then look out world. Or something like that.
Reports on the state of testing are secondhand at best, but the consensus is that while each of the production licensees is working on some sort of problem, no two licensees are experiencing the same problems.
The question is, is that a good thing for REFR, or a bad thing?
It's easy to think it could be good. After all, if no two licensees are having the same problems, then every problem is solved at every licensee but one. So, all that has to happen is to have the licensees get together and they'll easily have the solutions to all the problems between them.
But is it really that simple?
Talk to anyone who's ever worked in quality control, or anyone who's managed to stay awake through one of those training films on the topic of quality, and they'll emphatically answer that question "no".
To cover one obvious possibility, a fix for one problem has this tendency to cause other problems. If one licensee were to apply another licensee's "fix" for their problem, there's every reason to think that "fix" would cause the problems the other licensee was having.
But beyond that lies another annoying question. Why is it that no two licensees can replicate the same results? Are they not following the same process for producing film? Is there a fixed process for producing film? If not, why not? And furthermore, if not, how exactly are the licensees ever supposed to get on the "same page", when they're reading from different scripts, so to speak?
REFR likens its business model to that of Qualcomm, the company that owns the CDMA standard for cell phones. But Qualcomm got where they are today by actually spelling out that standard very specifically, and making sure anyone who licensed the technology followed the standard to the letter. There is no indication REFR is making any effort to do that at all, which, given their minimalist approach to the licensing model, should come as no surprise.
This is a recipe for chaos. Film that Hitachi produces may be entirely different from film that produced by Air Products, or DuPont, or Dainippon. And in the event any one of them hits upon a winning formula, are they going to be eager to share it with their competitors? Doubtful!
One promoter on the message boards is trying to get over the catchphrase, "I would not bet against Hitachi". (At least it's a step up from "Bang! Bang!" -- was this supposed to be investing or wrestling?) But by betting on Hitachi, are you also betting on Air Products, DuPont and Dainippon... or against them?
Besides which, I'll bet against anyone I damn well please, if I don't think they care about "winning".
Monday, July 11, 2005
A small problem
Short sellers in REFR got to see that magic word many of them have been waiting to see for years.
Yes, REFR has been delisted. Sort of. Technically, what has happened is that REFR has "phased down" from the Nasdaq National Market to the Nasdaq Small Cap Market.
(Editorial note: Actually, the notice of delisting was given today. Research Frontiers can avoid delisting by reaching a market cap in excess of $50 million, roughly $3.62 per share, for 10 consecutive trading days between now and August 4th. This probably explains in part today's uptrend in the stock.)
What does that mean? Well, as with so many other events related to REFR, it actually means very little in a substantive sense. REFR will remain REFR, and most people with positions in the company, long or short, will notice no direct changes in the way REFR trades.
One distinction that used to put some dread in the hearts of naive shareholders was the removal of the "bid test" for short sales. In other words, assuming that borrows were readily available, short sales could go off just as easily as any other sort of sales. Contrary to prevailing "wisdom", however, this omission did not open the floodgates for abusive short selling of small cap stocks.
However, that distinction has been removed with the implementation of Regulation SHO, so in fact there is no practical functional difference between the two markets.
Lack of substance notwithstanding, this event will no doubt be an irritation to fans of the stock. What it signifies is that REFR is roughly among the lowest sixth of market capitalizations among Nasdaq-listed companies. This is not necessarily a mantle of shame for new, small companies still on the ramp-up. For a company with two decades of history of public trading, however, it can be rather humiliating. If nothing else, it will be another negative factor for the inevitable next round of capital raising.
Promoters will doubtless downplay this development, and perhaps in a strict sense be right, but it's at least worth bringing up that REFR seemed to think it meant something when it first joined the National Market in 1997.
Apart from that, just another milestone on the road to blue oblivion.
Yes, REFR has been delisted. Sort of. Technically, what has happened is that REFR has "phased down" from the Nasdaq National Market to the Nasdaq Small Cap Market.
(Editorial note: Actually, the notice of delisting was given today. Research Frontiers can avoid delisting by reaching a market cap in excess of $50 million, roughly $3.62 per share, for 10 consecutive trading days between now and August 4th. This probably explains in part today's uptrend in the stock.)
What does that mean? Well, as with so many other events related to REFR, it actually means very little in a substantive sense. REFR will remain REFR, and most people with positions in the company, long or short, will notice no direct changes in the way REFR trades.
One distinction that used to put some dread in the hearts of naive shareholders was the removal of the "bid test" for short sales. In other words, assuming that borrows were readily available, short sales could go off just as easily as any other sort of sales. Contrary to prevailing "wisdom", however, this omission did not open the floodgates for abusive short selling of small cap stocks.
However, that distinction has been removed with the implementation of Regulation SHO, so in fact there is no practical functional difference between the two markets.
Lack of substance notwithstanding, this event will no doubt be an irritation to fans of the stock. What it signifies is that REFR is roughly among the lowest sixth of market capitalizations among Nasdaq-listed companies. This is not necessarily a mantle of shame for new, small companies still on the ramp-up. For a company with two decades of history of public trading, however, it can be rather humiliating. If nothing else, it will be another negative factor for the inevitable next round of capital raising.
Promoters will doubtless downplay this development, and perhaps in a strict sense be right, but it's at least worth bringing up that REFR seemed to think it meant something when it first joined the National Market in 1997.
Apart from that, just another milestone on the road to blue oblivion.
Friday, July 01, 2005
R-Class dismissed
Another door was quite firmly shut in REFR's face as Mercedes Benz announced the specifications for its new R-Class SUV/sedan hybrid. Originally known as the GST, for Grand Sports Tourer, their mention of a "panorama" roof, invoked memory of a similar term used by Daimler's Setra division, and led many to jump an automatic association of "panorama roof = SPD".
That assumption got it's answer today as Mercedes made its milestone announcement just weeks before production is slated to begin. The "panorama roof" is in, but no mention whatsoever is made of variable tinting. They do mention "privacy glass" on side and rear windows, but if there is one thing SPD is unambiguously not, it is privacy glass.
Of course, you won't find a promoter who will act like this matters one whit. All that matters is Hiatchi is working on production, and when they get there, VOOM!
And yes, I was trying to invoke the John Cleese rejoinder there.
Doubtless, they will come up with other tacks with which to keep flogging this horse, and when they do, I will be here to give them the coverage they richly deserve. However, today marks the end of the daily frequency of posts to this blog. New responsibilities figure to cut into the time I can devote to this journal, and in any event I feel the backstory of this strange, strange company has now been fairly told.
So with that, have a great Independence Day, and I'll be seeing you soon.
That assumption got it's answer today as Mercedes made its milestone announcement just weeks before production is slated to begin. The "panorama roof" is in, but no mention whatsoever is made of variable tinting. They do mention "privacy glass" on side and rear windows, but if there is one thing SPD is unambiguously not, it is privacy glass.
Of course, you won't find a promoter who will act like this matters one whit. All that matters is Hiatchi is working on production, and when they get there, VOOM!
And yes, I was trying to invoke the John Cleese rejoinder there.
Doubtless, they will come up with other tacks with which to keep flogging this horse, and when they do, I will be here to give them the coverage they richly deserve. However, today marks the end of the daily frequency of posts to this blog. New responsibilities figure to cut into the time I can devote to this journal, and in any event I feel the backstory of this strange, strange company has now been fairly told.
So with that, have a great Independence Day, and I'll be seeing you soon.
Thursday, June 30, 2005
Where'd the short interest go?
From mid 2001 through much of 2003, the short interest in REFR was a very large, albeit rather stable, two million shares. (For no apparent reason, promoters at the time chose to make up their own number, insisting that there was an additional half million "invisible" short interest. Today these same people will latch on to any excuse to declare the critics to be liars. Go figure.)
In theory, this represented a potential powderkeg for the shorts. If REFR were to suddenly achieve the success that had eluded them for decades, the wave of resulting buying from the short covering alone would lead to huge run-ups in the stock. But then again, we're talking REFR, so shorts were rightly unworried about that eventuality.
Nevertheless, the promoters were unperturbed that, as delay built upon delay, a golden opportunity to catch the shorts off-guard might be slipping away. Why? Because, they said, the short interest wasn't going anywhere. There was no way for the shorts to cover their positions.
It's unclear how they arrived at that conclusion, given that the claim was more sloganeering than debate. But whatever the thought process was, the shareholders were completely convinced. The shorts can't cover and that was all that needs to be said. If REFR took a month, or a year, or ten years to finally succeed, it wouldn't matter because the short interest would still be stuck where it was, waiting to be squeezed to infinity and beyond.
Today the short interest holds steady, at a bit less than one million shares.
Since we'll never get a mea culpa or other explanation from the promoters regarding how they wound up being so wrong about so many things (they're too busy asserting how they will eventually be proven right -- yeah, I know) it falls to the rest of us to piece together what happened.
Two major events appear to have made the difference. The first and easiest one was REFR's delisting from the Russell index. Index funds dumped over half a million shares, and while this weighed heavily on the stock, the stock never quite "broke". It was by and large an orderly decline, with trading volumes increasing nicely to accomodate the mandatory selling by the funds. Where were all these buyers coming from to cushion the fall? It was the short sellers, of course, capturing very nice profits from shares shorted from anywhere from $12 to more than $30.
But prior to that came a rather mysterious occurrence. During one relatively uneventful month, the short interest dropped by more than half a million shares between two reporting periods. There had been a small rise during the period in question, but one that soon fell back, and in any event there was hardly enough volume for that many shares to have been covered in the open market.
So what happened there? Apparently some entity or other had a very large "boxed" position, one hedged against a long position or something equivalent. In the most common cases, such hedging involves options, or shares of a company the shorted company is acquiring, but neither of those applies to REFR.
We may, in fact, never know exactly what happened, but some have strong suspicions. One involves REFR's financier of the time, Ailouros Ltd. While they were supposedly barred from shorting REFR stock in their agreement, it always felt odd that they seemingly had no problem with REFR continuously selling them shares even as they continued to fall. In a few cases, REFR was rather embarassingly found to have been buying the shares right back from Ailouros, at a loss to REFR. But it never seemed right that Ailouros would continue on as they had without some kind of ace in the hole. Could a short position of over half a million shares have been that ace?
Regardless, the shorts today are manifestly in superlative shape, with a relatively mild million shares to worry about covering, and with the stock hovering around 14-year lows. Those still long remain defiant, insisting that one day the shorts will get theirs.
From here, though, it looks like they already did.
In theory, this represented a potential powderkeg for the shorts. If REFR were to suddenly achieve the success that had eluded them for decades, the wave of resulting buying from the short covering alone would lead to huge run-ups in the stock. But then again, we're talking REFR, so shorts were rightly unworried about that eventuality.
Nevertheless, the promoters were unperturbed that, as delay built upon delay, a golden opportunity to catch the shorts off-guard might be slipping away. Why? Because, they said, the short interest wasn't going anywhere. There was no way for the shorts to cover their positions.
It's unclear how they arrived at that conclusion, given that the claim was more sloganeering than debate. But whatever the thought process was, the shareholders were completely convinced. The shorts can't cover and that was all that needs to be said. If REFR took a month, or a year, or ten years to finally succeed, it wouldn't matter because the short interest would still be stuck where it was, waiting to be squeezed to infinity and beyond.
Today the short interest holds steady, at a bit less than one million shares.
Since we'll never get a mea culpa or other explanation from the promoters regarding how they wound up being so wrong about so many things (they're too busy asserting how they will eventually be proven right -- yeah, I know) it falls to the rest of us to piece together what happened.
Two major events appear to have made the difference. The first and easiest one was REFR's delisting from the Russell index. Index funds dumped over half a million shares, and while this weighed heavily on the stock, the stock never quite "broke". It was by and large an orderly decline, with trading volumes increasing nicely to accomodate the mandatory selling by the funds. Where were all these buyers coming from to cushion the fall? It was the short sellers, of course, capturing very nice profits from shares shorted from anywhere from $12 to more than $30.
But prior to that came a rather mysterious occurrence. During one relatively uneventful month, the short interest dropped by more than half a million shares between two reporting periods. There had been a small rise during the period in question, but one that soon fell back, and in any event there was hardly enough volume for that many shares to have been covered in the open market.
So what happened there? Apparently some entity or other had a very large "boxed" position, one hedged against a long position or something equivalent. In the most common cases, such hedging involves options, or shares of a company the shorted company is acquiring, but neither of those applies to REFR.
We may, in fact, never know exactly what happened, but some have strong suspicions. One involves REFR's financier of the time, Ailouros Ltd. While they were supposedly barred from shorting REFR stock in their agreement, it always felt odd that they seemingly had no problem with REFR continuously selling them shares even as they continued to fall. In a few cases, REFR was rather embarassingly found to have been buying the shares right back from Ailouros, at a loss to REFR. But it never seemed right that Ailouros would continue on as they had without some kind of ace in the hole. Could a short position of over half a million shares have been that ace?
Regardless, the shorts today are manifestly in superlative shape, with a relatively mild million shares to worry about covering, and with the stock hovering around 14-year lows. Those still long remain defiant, insisting that one day the shorts will get theirs.
From here, though, it looks like they already did.
Wednesday, June 29, 2005
So how's that plan coming along?
Going back into the PR archives, I want bring out the REFR's master plan as articulated three years ago, at the 2002 shareholder's meeting.
Step one appears to be "having SPD demonstration products made in large quantities". That much they seem to have successfully accomplished. This was supposed to be a "promotional tool" to "increase awareness of SPD technology". That part doesn't seem to have worked so well. Neither the "100 station" radio show, nor the "14 million viewer" TV segment spurred enough demand to, say, keep SPD Inc. in business.
Skipping a bit ahead to founder Robert Saxe's comment: "InspecTech’s model is spectacularly attractive and should convince aircraft owners to equip their planes with SPD-Smart windows." (But didn't.) "By year-end many of the world’s hundreds of ‘Completion Centers’ in which aircraft are refurbished could have this product to show their customers." (But didn't.) "Completion Centers are already being used by InspecTech to market and install SPD aircraft windows." (Meaning, they outsourced the installation.) "I expect this to be a powerful sales promotion tool for SPD technology." (As with every other expectation Saxe has had, not so much.)
You get the basic idea. All these demonstration products served two purposes: one, to allow management to claim products were being made, and two, to make it appear to the shareholders that they were getting serious about marketing SPD.
It was enough to get the shareholders excited at the time. Three years later... the results speak for themselves.
Step one appears to be "having SPD demonstration products made in large quantities". That much they seem to have successfully accomplished. This was supposed to be a "promotional tool" to "increase awareness of SPD technology". That part doesn't seem to have worked so well. Neither the "100 station" radio show, nor the "14 million viewer" TV segment spurred enough demand to, say, keep SPD Inc. in business.
Skipping a bit ahead to founder Robert Saxe's comment: "InspecTech’s model is spectacularly attractive and should convince aircraft owners to equip their planes with SPD-Smart windows." (But didn't.) "By year-end many of the world’s hundreds of ‘Completion Centers’ in which aircraft are refurbished could have this product to show their customers." (But didn't.) "Completion Centers are already being used by InspecTech to market and install SPD aircraft windows." (Meaning, they outsourced the installation.) "I expect this to be a powerful sales promotion tool for SPD technology." (As with every other expectation Saxe has had, not so much.)
You get the basic idea. All these demonstration products served two purposes: one, to allow management to claim products were being made, and two, to make it appear to the shareholders that they were getting serious about marketing SPD.
It was enough to get the shareholders excited at the time. Three years later... the results speak for themselves.
Tuesday, June 28, 2005
To market, to market, to get a fat nothing
I was going to go back an address an aspect of the R. J. Falkner report on REFR, when I found something peculiar. As of noon Eastern, the website is gone and replaced by a "temporarily out of service" notice.
This may mean a lot of things or perhaps nothing at all, but we'll keep a watch on it.
In the meantime, we'll go out on a limb and trust N. Dixon's recounting of the Falkner report for the subject of the markets SPD is/will/hopes to someday participate in.
Flat Glass: very general and redundant with many of the specific products mentioned afterwards, so we'll set it aside for now.
Automotive rear-view mirrors: This market was captured quite thoroughly in the mid 90's by Gentex. Years later, Harary tried to downplay the defeat by declaring the market too small to be worth pursuing(!) Nevertheless, as with old licensees gone inactive, old market long since lost never get dropped from SPD's "potential".
Electrochromic mirrors: Apparently this is there to suggest that Gentex has only a very small part of the market, and that there's plenty of room for SPD to muscle in. Of course that flies in the face of Harary's "too small" declaration, but since when has consistency mattered here?
Automotive sunvisors: Never mind, apparently, that no government is going to allow material that defaults to dark on the front windshield.
Flat panel displays: This one is a real throwback, to the days when laptops largely had monocolor displays and widespread active-matrix LCD was still a pipe dream. LCD has come a long way since then. And SPD?
Eyewear (Prescription, Non-Prescription, Adjustable): They're still holding on to that one regardless of how thorough a failure the Vision-Ease experiment was.
Aircraft Windows: Covered.
The theory is that REFR only requires a very small amount of headway in any one of the above markets to be an instant success and destroy the shortsellers in its stock.
But if that were so, then what does it say about REFR's inability over the course of four decades to accomplish such a trivial-sounding task?
This may mean a lot of things or perhaps nothing at all, but we'll keep a watch on it.
In the meantime, we'll go out on a limb and trust N. Dixon's recounting of the Falkner report for the subject of the markets SPD is/will/hopes to someday participate in.
Flat Glass: very general and redundant with many of the specific products mentioned afterwards, so we'll set it aside for now.
Automotive rear-view mirrors: This market was captured quite thoroughly in the mid 90's by Gentex. Years later, Harary tried to downplay the defeat by declaring the market too small to be worth pursuing(!) Nevertheless, as with old licensees gone inactive, old market long since lost never get dropped from SPD's "potential".
Electrochromic mirrors: Apparently this is there to suggest that Gentex has only a very small part of the market, and that there's plenty of room for SPD to muscle in. Of course that flies in the face of Harary's "too small" declaration, but since when has consistency mattered here?
Automotive sunvisors: Never mind, apparently, that no government is going to allow material that defaults to dark on the front windshield.
Flat panel displays: This one is a real throwback, to the days when laptops largely had monocolor displays and widespread active-matrix LCD was still a pipe dream. LCD has come a long way since then. And SPD?
Eyewear (Prescription, Non-Prescription, Adjustable): They're still holding on to that one regardless of how thorough a failure the Vision-Ease experiment was.
Aircraft Windows: Covered.
The theory is that REFR only requires a very small amount of headway in any one of the above markets to be an instant success and destroy the shortsellers in its stock.
But if that were so, then what does it say about REFR's inability over the course of four decades to accomplish such a trivial-sounding task?
Monday, June 27, 2005
Lowlights of the summer newsletter
Thanks to N. Dixon for picking these comments out of the Summer Newsletter and making my job a lot easier.
...our licensees have received strong indications that substantial orders for several different markets will be placed ....
Nothing like using a lot of words to say absolutely nothing, eh? If nothing comes of it, it won't be REFR's fault, and it won't be the licensees fault, it'll be the customers' fault for giving false indications as to their interest. Darn them!
Notice, though, how nobody seems to have their orders in now. You'd think that if people really want this stuff there'd be a waiting list or something.
.....prospective customers in the automotive, aircraft and architectural fields for products that will require substantial volumes of SPD film.
That's about as close to mentioning Boeing as the newsletter gets. "Prospective customers", translated, means "people we'll try to sell this stuff to."
.....many successful innovations such as xerography, which is better known as photocopying, have required decades to achieve. These efforts usually require more time, effort and expense to achieve than the entrepreneurs involved originally expected. That has certainly been true in our case as well.
Ah yes, the old chestnut of comparing yourself directly to great success stories of the past. The fact that when you actually examine the details, you don't stack up favorably at all, never matters. Xerography, i.e. the technology behind copying machines of the latter half of the last century, did take a certain amount of time to go from original design to commercialization. However, a cursory look at Xerox's own history page puts paid to the notion that the developments are anything close to similar.
The time from original patent to commercial introduction was seven years, not forty. Furthermore, this was in the 1940's when innovation in general moved a lot slower. And then there was the little matter of World War II going on, which diverted resources away from this kind of development.
Xerox, or Haloid as it was then called, had a very profitable and well-established business in photographic paper going on in tandem with their xerography research. In short, the company was already successful and self-sufficient.
Probably most tellingly, Xerox depending on a single "outside" source, well-funded by Xerox, for development of xerography. Contrast that with REFR, who signs on everyone and anyone it can to be part of the group effort, resulting, at best, in much duplication of effort and competitive distrust. And that's assuming that the licensees are even motivated by the meager incentives REFR can offer to move forward.
The Xerox story is one of several Harary, like Saxe before him, likes to try to draw comparisons with REFR. Others include Microsoft, Edison's light bulb, and Henry Ford's automobile. It's a really sick display, and REFR management ought to be ashamed.
Except, I doubt "shame" is anything they're capable of.
One more:
.....I believe that you have a sound basis on which to be optimistic that a successful commercial introduction of second-generation SPD film will be forthcoming.
And a sound basis on which to dismiss failure as the result of "overoptimism". After all, who can find fault with someone for just being too optimistic?
Besides a realist, I mean.
...our licensees have received strong indications that substantial orders for several different markets will be placed ....
Nothing like using a lot of words to say absolutely nothing, eh? If nothing comes of it, it won't be REFR's fault, and it won't be the licensees fault, it'll be the customers' fault for giving false indications as to their interest. Darn them!
Notice, though, how nobody seems to have their orders in now. You'd think that if people really want this stuff there'd be a waiting list or something.
.....prospective customers in the automotive, aircraft and architectural fields for products that will require substantial volumes of SPD film.
That's about as close to mentioning Boeing as the newsletter gets. "Prospective customers", translated, means "people we'll try to sell this stuff to."
.....many successful innovations such as xerography, which is better known as photocopying, have required decades to achieve. These efforts usually require more time, effort and expense to achieve than the entrepreneurs involved originally expected. That has certainly been true in our case as well.
Ah yes, the old chestnut of comparing yourself directly to great success stories of the past. The fact that when you actually examine the details, you don't stack up favorably at all, never matters. Xerography, i.e. the technology behind copying machines of the latter half of the last century, did take a certain amount of time to go from original design to commercialization. However, a cursory look at Xerox's own history page puts paid to the notion that the developments are anything close to similar.
The time from original patent to commercial introduction was seven years, not forty. Furthermore, this was in the 1940's when innovation in general moved a lot slower. And then there was the little matter of World War II going on, which diverted resources away from this kind of development.
Xerox, or Haloid as it was then called, had a very profitable and well-established business in photographic paper going on in tandem with their xerography research. In short, the company was already successful and self-sufficient.
Probably most tellingly, Xerox depending on a single "outside" source, well-funded by Xerox, for development of xerography. Contrast that with REFR, who signs on everyone and anyone it can to be part of the group effort, resulting, at best, in much duplication of effort and competitive distrust. And that's assuming that the licensees are even motivated by the meager incentives REFR can offer to move forward.
The Xerox story is one of several Harary, like Saxe before him, likes to try to draw comparisons with REFR. Others include Microsoft, Edison's light bulb, and Henry Ford's automobile. It's a really sick display, and REFR management ought to be ashamed.
Except, I doubt "shame" is anything they're capable of.
One more:
.....I believe that you have a sound basis on which to be optimistic that a successful commercial introduction of second-generation SPD film will be forthcoming.
And a sound basis on which to dismiss failure as the result of "overoptimism". After all, who can find fault with someone for just being too optimistic?
Besides a realist, I mean.
Friday, June 24, 2005
It's summertime and excuses are easy
Just in time to catch what is looking like a near-term bottom in the stock, REFR has come out with its summer newsletter.
The bulk of the "newsletter" is a detailed recounting, including full transcripts(!) of the annual shareholder meeting from two weeks ago. A first reading seems to back up early reports, so I won't go into too many details. I will note, that while they mention "representatives from Hitachi Chemical", they mentioned none of them by name. This kind of undercuts the insistence that he was at the meeting and is still fully in charge there, rather than retired as some reports have it. (You'd think this would be an easy point to settle!)
I would like to note the last paragraph of the newsletter. Ever vigilant for the latest up-to-date developments, REFR management decided to throw in a few "reassuring words" about the rather dramatic collapse of the stock over the past couple of weeks. This includes the popular chestnute, "the fundamentals have not changed," and that is certainly most true in REFR's case. One has to have fundamentals in the first place, for them to change.
The bulk of the "newsletter" is a detailed recounting, including full transcripts(!) of the annual shareholder meeting from two weeks ago. A first reading seems to back up early reports, so I won't go into too many details. I will note, that while they mention "representatives from Hitachi Chemical", they mentioned none of them by name. This kind of undercuts the insistence that he was at the meeting and is still fully in charge there, rather than retired as some reports have it. (You'd think this would be an easy point to settle!)
I would like to note the last paragraph of the newsletter. Ever vigilant for the latest up-to-date developments, REFR management decided to throw in a few "reassuring words" about the rather dramatic collapse of the stock over the past couple of weeks. This includes the popular chestnute, "the fundamentals have not changed," and that is certainly most true in REFR's case. One has to have fundamentals in the first place, for them to change.
Thursday, June 23, 2005
Checking the scorecard
Okay, it's been over a month now, so let's check the REFR announcement scorecard and see how it's coming along.
Hmm. Um. Okay, I guess I'm going to have to come up with something else to write about today.
All right, how about this. In the past few minutes (as I am writing this), REFR traded down to $2.90 per share. This takes out the split-adjusted low price of 1992 ($2.933). To find a time when REFR traded lower than today, you have to go back to July 5, 1991, when REFR got down to $5 1/4, or, adjusted for splits, $2.80 per share.
For reference, here is a list of remaining "lows" that REFR has between it and its all-time low, a split-adjusted 80 cents per share:
Hmm. Um. Okay, I guess I'm going to have to come up with something else to write about today.
All right, how about this. In the past few minutes (as I am writing this), REFR traded down to $2.90 per share. This takes out the split-adjusted low price of 1992 ($2.933). To find a time when REFR traded lower than today, you have to go back to July 5, 1991, when REFR got down to $5 1/4, or, adjusted for splits, $2.80 per share.
For reference, here is a list of remaining "lows" that REFR has between it and its all-time low, a split-adjusted 80 cents per share:
low price split-adjusted (15/8 prior to 1994)Of course, having assembled this list, I have no doubt set in motion a wave of claims from the diehards that they in fact bought at the low prices above, but what can you do. Besides nod indulgently and chuckle to yourself, I suppose.
06/23/05 2.90 2.9
07/05/91 5 1/4 2.8
07/03/91 4 1/4 2.2667
07/02/91 3 3/4 2
06/27/91 3 5/8 1.9333
06/12/91 3 1/2 1.8667
06/03/91 3 1/4 1.7333
05/31/91 3 1.6
04/02/91 2 1.0667
02/22/91 1 7/8 1
12/07/90 1 3/4 0.9333
09/27/90 1 1/2 0.8 (all-time low)
Wednesday, June 22, 2005
Throwing money away
Today I thought I'd just perform a little tallying of the kinds of losses insiders have suffered on their various purchases over the past couple of years.
I'll start with founder Bob Saxe, the least prolific of the buyers (which probably tells you something right there):
(Losses are based on a price of REFR of $3.00 per share, today's low as of noon Eastern.)
4/20/05: 500 shares REFR @ $5.15 : loss = $1,075
11/12/03: 200 @ $9.48 : loss = $1,296
11/11/03: 200 @ $9.31 : loss = $1,262
11/10/03: 200 @ $9.81 : loss = $1,362
Total loss for Bob Saxe = $4,995
Now President Joe Harary, who has also been absent from the buy side for a while:
6/3/04: 1,729 @ $8.1875 : loss = $8,969
Total loss for Joe Harary = $8,969
Vice President Michael LaPointe, also nearly a year removed from his last purchase:
6/28/04: 500 @ $7.09 : loss = $2,045
5/20/04: 500 @ $8.798 : loss = $2,899
4/19/04: 500 @ $10.44 : loss = $3,720
1/26/04 175 @ $12.05 : loss = $1,584
1/26/04: 250 @ $11.98 : loss = $2,245
Total loss for Michael LaPointe: $12,493
Now we get to the more prolific buyers. First up, director and former forum stock promoter Al Malvino, with a lesson on how not to dollar-cost average:
6/17/05: 1000 @ $3.62 : loss = $620
3/18/05: 1000 @ $5.86 : loss = $2,860
2/18/05: 500 @ $5.97 : loss = $1,485
1/19/05: 500 @ $5.98 : loss = $1,490
12/29/04: 400 @ $6.00 : loss = $1,200
12/2/04: 600 @ $6.11 : loss = $1,866
11/22/04: 300 @ $6.74 : loss = $1,122
7/27/04: 700 @ $6.70 : loss = $2,590
7/9/04: 300 @ $6.77 : loss = $1,131
6/16/04: 569 @ $7.85 : loss = $2,760
6/4/04: 731 @ $8.674 : loss = $4,147
5/24/04: 1000 @ $8.846: loss = $5,846
5/18/04: 600 @ $9.05: loss = $3,630
5/17/04: 600 @ $9.20: loss = $3,720
5/14/04: 700 @ $9.526: loss = $4,568
5/12/04: 700 @ $9.70: loss = $4,690
5/3/04: 400 @ $9.71: loss = $2,684
2/4/04: 3000 @ $12.125: loss = $27,375
2/3/04: 1000 @ $12.12: loss = $9,120
1/7/04: 1000 @ $8.91: loss = $5,910
12/30/03: 1000 @ $9.12 : loss = $6,120
12/5/03: 300 @ $9.10 : loss = $1,830
11/10/03: 300 @ $9.30 : loss = $1,890
10/21/03: 300 @ $11.65 : loss = $2,595
10/8/03: 305 @ $11.55 : loss= $2,608
9/26/03 300 @ $12.05 : loss = $2,715
9/3/03: 300 @ $12.00 : loss = $2,700
7/30/03: 200 @ $13.35 : loss = $2,070
7/15/03: 800 @ $14.56 : loss = $9,248
7/10/03: 200 @ $15.35 : loss = $2,470
Total loss for Dr. Al Malvino: $123,060
As bad as that is, it's still peanuts next to the prize patsy of the board of directors, Corporate Secretary Victor Keen. His buys may have been fewer in number, but he made them count. Against himself:
5/4/05: 10000 @ $3.84 : loss = $8,400
8/19/04: 16300 @ $5.88 : loss = $46,944
7/19/04: 5500 @ $6.75 : loss = $20,625
6/29/04: 10000 @ $7.21: loss = $42,100
6/14/04: 5000 @ $7.79 : loss = $23,950
11/11/03: 5000 @ $9.36: loss = $31,800
9/30/03: 5000 @ $11.51: loss = $42,550
7/15-16/03: 5000 @ $14.50 : loss = $57,500
7/3/03: 1300 @ $14.96 : loss = $15,548
7/3/03: 5000 @ $15.00 : loss = $60,000
6/25/03: 10000 @ $12.05 : loss = $90,500
Total loss for Victor Keen: $439,917
On aggregate, just from buys made in the last 24 months, insiders have lost a total of $589,434.
The purpose of this observation is not to gloat, mind you. I am quite certain that all of the above insiders, even Mr. Keen, can easily afford to lose everything they have invested in REFR stock.
Rather, I just want to observe that when you ask a shareholder why he continues to have faith in this company, one of the things inevitably highlighted is the company's stellar track record of insider buys versus sales. After all, the insider must know something good is in the offing, or they wouldn't buy, would they?
Well, the above illustrates just what that line of thinking got the average investor in REFR. A huge pile of losses with no apparent way out of them.
That is what comes from letting others do your thinking for you.
I'll start with founder Bob Saxe, the least prolific of the buyers (which probably tells you something right there):
(Losses are based on a price of REFR of $3.00 per share, today's low as of noon Eastern.)
4/20/05: 500 shares REFR @ $5.15 : loss = $1,075
11/12/03: 200 @ $9.48 : loss = $1,296
11/11/03: 200 @ $9.31 : loss = $1,262
11/10/03: 200 @ $9.81 : loss = $1,362
Total loss for Bob Saxe = $4,995
Now President Joe Harary, who has also been absent from the buy side for a while:
6/3/04: 1,729 @ $8.1875 : loss = $8,969
Total loss for Joe Harary = $8,969
Vice President Michael LaPointe, also nearly a year removed from his last purchase:
6/28/04: 500 @ $7.09 : loss = $2,045
5/20/04: 500 @ $8.798 : loss = $2,899
4/19/04: 500 @ $10.44 : loss = $3,720
1/26/04 175 @ $12.05 : loss = $1,584
1/26/04: 250 @ $11.98 : loss = $2,245
Total loss for Michael LaPointe: $12,493
Now we get to the more prolific buyers. First up, director and former forum stock promoter Al Malvino, with a lesson on how not to dollar-cost average:
6/17/05: 1000 @ $3.62 : loss = $620
3/18/05: 1000 @ $5.86 : loss = $2,860
2/18/05: 500 @ $5.97 : loss = $1,485
1/19/05: 500 @ $5.98 : loss = $1,490
12/29/04: 400 @ $6.00 : loss = $1,200
12/2/04: 600 @ $6.11 : loss = $1,866
11/22/04: 300 @ $6.74 : loss = $1,122
7/27/04: 700 @ $6.70 : loss = $2,590
7/9/04: 300 @ $6.77 : loss = $1,131
6/16/04: 569 @ $7.85 : loss = $2,760
6/4/04: 731 @ $8.674 : loss = $4,147
5/24/04: 1000 @ $8.846: loss = $5,846
5/18/04: 600 @ $9.05: loss = $3,630
5/17/04: 600 @ $9.20: loss = $3,720
5/14/04: 700 @ $9.526: loss = $4,568
5/12/04: 700 @ $9.70: loss = $4,690
5/3/04: 400 @ $9.71: loss = $2,684
2/4/04: 3000 @ $12.125: loss = $27,375
2/3/04: 1000 @ $12.12: loss = $9,120
1/7/04: 1000 @ $8.91: loss = $5,910
12/30/03: 1000 @ $9.12 : loss = $6,120
12/5/03: 300 @ $9.10 : loss = $1,830
11/10/03: 300 @ $9.30 : loss = $1,890
10/21/03: 300 @ $11.65 : loss = $2,595
10/8/03: 305 @ $11.55 : loss= $2,608
9/26/03 300 @ $12.05 : loss = $2,715
9/3/03: 300 @ $12.00 : loss = $2,700
7/30/03: 200 @ $13.35 : loss = $2,070
7/15/03: 800 @ $14.56 : loss = $9,248
7/10/03: 200 @ $15.35 : loss = $2,470
Total loss for Dr. Al Malvino: $123,060
As bad as that is, it's still peanuts next to the prize patsy of the board of directors, Corporate Secretary Victor Keen. His buys may have been fewer in number, but he made them count. Against himself:
5/4/05: 10000 @ $3.84 : loss = $8,400
8/19/04: 16300 @ $5.88 : loss = $46,944
7/19/04: 5500 @ $6.75 : loss = $20,625
6/29/04: 10000 @ $7.21: loss = $42,100
6/14/04: 5000 @ $7.79 : loss = $23,950
11/11/03: 5000 @ $9.36: loss = $31,800
9/30/03: 5000 @ $11.51: loss = $42,550
7/15-16/03: 5000 @ $14.50 : loss = $57,500
7/3/03: 1300 @ $14.96 : loss = $15,548
7/3/03: 5000 @ $15.00 : loss = $60,000
6/25/03: 10000 @ $12.05 : loss = $90,500
Total loss for Victor Keen: $439,917
On aggregate, just from buys made in the last 24 months, insiders have lost a total of $589,434.
The purpose of this observation is not to gloat, mind you. I am quite certain that all of the above insiders, even Mr. Keen, can easily afford to lose everything they have invested in REFR stock.
Rather, I just want to observe that when you ask a shareholder why he continues to have faith in this company, one of the things inevitably highlighted is the company's stellar track record of insider buys versus sales. After all, the insider must know something good is in the offing, or they wouldn't buy, would they?
Well, the above illustrates just what that line of thinking got the average investor in REFR. A huge pile of losses with no apparent way out of them.
That is what comes from letting others do your thinking for you.
Tuesday, June 21, 2005
R. J. Falkner's sound and fury, signifying nothing
It is quite an amazing feat that Bob Saxe and company have managed to keep the cycle of recapitalization going for a full forty years without ever having produced anything of value to the marketplace. Certainly that is attributable in part to management's virtuoso playing of the stalling game, stretching things out as long as humanly possible and counting on faded memories and a constant influx of new players unfamiliar with their past to carry them on to the next stage. That they have managed to keep it up for this long without having diluted the stock beyond recognition is most remarkable indeed.
Still, it all would have been a lot harder if Saxe and company didn't have a willing accomplice or two willing to help them out. And one of their primary accomplices, particularly in recent years, has been the "research" firm of R. J. Falkner and Company.
Falkner is one of a thankfully dying breed of research firms who put out reports on companies that pay them to do so. Not surprisingly, the reports are uniformly and usually quite wildly bullish.
Falkner's report on REFR is no exception. Their latest summation, dated November of last year (when REFR's price was roughly $7.50, or more than twice today's levels), predicts "REFR?s long-term prospects for profitability and growth will be supported by accelerating growth in royalty income within the next 6-12 months."
For those uninitiated with how these forecasts work, this means that, a little over six months having passed since the report was issued, a new version, with a renewed 6-12 month time horizon, is almost certainly due out shortly.
Some, however, suspect that Falkner's assistance in the promotion of REFR goes beyond their silly "research reports". On its disclaimer page, where Falkner customarily admits how much they are paid by the company being "researched" ($3,500 a month in REFR's case, or more than 1% of the company's operating budget), they also add that they provide "investor relations services" to REFR.
Now, given that REFR already has a perfectly competent investor relations person on staff, the question asks, what kind of "investor relations" does Falkner do for REFR? A sampling of disclaimers for other companies' reports characterizes the compensation as being "for the periodic publication of research reports". So clearly Falkner is doing something else for REFR. What might that be?
One rather blunt theory is that Falkner is responsible for a great deal of the promotional activity on the message board forums. While it's a little hard to accept that REFR could get all that much "bang" for $42,000 a year, there is some evidence to support the suggestion. Much of Falkner's report gets requoted endlessly on the forums. Some have claimed this even happens before the fact, that issues raised on the forums subsequently find their way into Falkner reports, though this has not really been established. Another thread is the frequently raised notion of "paid bashers". While this is an extremely popular accusation on the forums of stock of all types, despite the fact that the practice has never been proven, what would be more natural than assuming the contra side is being paid for their postings, if you yourself are being paid for yours?
At any rate, that's probably far more than enough theorizing for a topic upon which little proof of anything exists. For a good chuckle, read the whole Falkner REFR report from beginning to end and see for yourself just how horribly wrong it has already proven. Tomorrow, I'll show you where you can read past reports from Falkner, to get a really good perspective on just how horribly wrong they have been.
Still, it all would have been a lot harder if Saxe and company didn't have a willing accomplice or two willing to help them out. And one of their primary accomplices, particularly in recent years, has been the "research" firm of R. J. Falkner and Company.
Falkner is one of a thankfully dying breed of research firms who put out reports on companies that pay them to do so. Not surprisingly, the reports are uniformly and usually quite wildly bullish.
Falkner's report on REFR is no exception. Their latest summation, dated November of last year (when REFR's price was roughly $7.50, or more than twice today's levels), predicts "REFR?s long-term prospects for profitability and growth will be supported by accelerating growth in royalty income within the next 6-12 months."
For those uninitiated with how these forecasts work, this means that, a little over six months having passed since the report was issued, a new version, with a renewed 6-12 month time horizon, is almost certainly due out shortly.
Some, however, suspect that Falkner's assistance in the promotion of REFR goes beyond their silly "research reports". On its disclaimer page, where Falkner customarily admits how much they are paid by the company being "researched" ($3,500 a month in REFR's case, or more than 1% of the company's operating budget), they also add that they provide "investor relations services" to REFR.
Now, given that REFR already has a perfectly competent investor relations person on staff, the question asks, what kind of "investor relations" does Falkner do for REFR? A sampling of disclaimers for other companies' reports characterizes the compensation as being "for the periodic publication of research reports". So clearly Falkner is doing something else for REFR. What might that be?
One rather blunt theory is that Falkner is responsible for a great deal of the promotional activity on the message board forums. While it's a little hard to accept that REFR could get all that much "bang" for $42,000 a year, there is some evidence to support the suggestion. Much of Falkner's report gets requoted endlessly on the forums. Some have claimed this even happens before the fact, that issues raised on the forums subsequently find their way into Falkner reports, though this has not really been established. Another thread is the frequently raised notion of "paid bashers". While this is an extremely popular accusation on the forums of stock of all types, despite the fact that the practice has never been proven, what would be more natural than assuming the contra side is being paid for their postings, if you yourself are being paid for yours?
At any rate, that's probably far more than enough theorizing for a topic upon which little proof of anything exists. For a good chuckle, read the whole Falkner REFR report from beginning to end and see for yourself just how horribly wrong it has already proven. Tomorrow, I'll show you where you can read past reports from Falkner, to get a really good perspective on just how horribly wrong they have been.
Monday, June 20, 2005
Feeling flushed
The forums were abuzz all weekend as promoters tried to rationalize their way out of the seemingly straightforward conclusion from Dreamliner designed Klaus Brauer's comments that Boeing was importing the technology JAMCO puts in its airplane lavatory windows, for use in the main cabin windows.
The biggest objection appears to be that the JAMCO lavatory windows are strictly "on-off", not dimming. Of course, that is premised on the theory that the tech from the lavatory will be transplanted as-is with no refinement whatsoever, which seems a shaky contention at best. And really, the whole line of thinking that liquid crystal light shading is strictly binary is quite thoroughly exploded by the development of modern LCD computer monitors and LCD televisions.
Another is that there is no documentation of JAMCO products appearing in business jets, as mentioned in the Brauer comments. Apparently the expectation is that JAMCO, like REFR, would publicize every single sale they make.
One counter-theory that seems to have been definitively answered even to the promoters' reluctant satisfaction is that liquid crystal windows could only function in temperature-controlled interior environments, and that the windows must therefore be facing the cabin interior, not the outside. Unfortunately for this line of thinking, there are photos showing the window to be behind the toilet, which would place it on the exterior of the aircraft.
One can never really assume that this story is making it outside the somewhat insulated world of the message board forums, but it is notable that the stock is diving to fresh lows even as I write this. One thing seems certain: management is almost certainly glad to have gotten the annual meeting out of the way before this revelation broke.
The biggest objection appears to be that the JAMCO lavatory windows are strictly "on-off", not dimming. Of course, that is premised on the theory that the tech from the lavatory will be transplanted as-is with no refinement whatsoever, which seems a shaky contention at best. And really, the whole line of thinking that liquid crystal light shading is strictly binary is quite thoroughly exploded by the development of modern LCD computer monitors and LCD televisions.
Another is that there is no documentation of JAMCO products appearing in business jets, as mentioned in the Brauer comments. Apparently the expectation is that JAMCO, like REFR, would publicize every single sale they make.
One counter-theory that seems to have been definitively answered even to the promoters' reluctant satisfaction is that liquid crystal windows could only function in temperature-controlled interior environments, and that the windows must therefore be facing the cabin interior, not the outside. Unfortunately for this line of thinking, there are photos showing the window to be behind the toilet, which would place it on the exterior of the aircraft.
One can never really assume that this story is making it outside the somewhat insulated world of the message board forums, but it is notable that the stock is diving to fresh lows even as I write this. One thing seems certain: management is almost certainly glad to have gotten the annual meeting out of the way before this revelation broke.
Friday, June 17, 2005
They're really in a jam(co) now
Some days just show why doing this is all worth it.
For many months, the promotional contention was that Boeing was going to buy SPD windows from Inspectech Aero Servies to fulfill their specification of electronically dimming cabin windows. In response to the reasonable observation that Inspectech is in fact nothing more than a broker for the technology with no manufacturing capabilities of its own, promoters demanded, in effect, "well, if it isn't Inspectech and SPD, then who? Who dammit???"
That came to a crashing end yesterday on the forums. The trigger was a post by our friend Ed Wesnofske. In clarification of the most recent challenge, Ed posted a quote from Klaus Brauer, the head of interior design for the 787 project, wherein he stated that the mystery technology for the cabin windows "is in use on some business jets today and, in fact, in some lavatory windows on commercial airplanes."
While Wesnofske's source on the quote is unclear (it was described only as an "online chat"), this proved to be a vital clue. Forum poster xavierducats seized upon the new information and very quickly researched up what very much appears to be the answer to the long-standing riddle.
Meet the JAMCO luxury lavatory. It's certainly not like anything you'll find on your typical domestic flight, that's for certain. But scroll down to the bottom and -- what's this? -- a liquid crystal window that goes clear and dark at the touch of a button. Just as Brauer said.
And if that weren't enough, xavierducats followed that up by referencing the JAMCO news page, wherein JAMCO reveals a long-standing supplier relationship with Boeing, including a significant upgrade in standing for the 787 project.
So there's hardly any room for doubt at all that this is the technology Brauer had in mind with the lavatory comment. Mind you, a handful will remain in denial, as JAMCO has not yet explicitly stated that they are doing the cabin windows, but for all intents and purposes, this particular storyline is over.
But stay tuned. They'll come up with something else soon. They have to.
For many months, the promotional contention was that Boeing was going to buy SPD windows from Inspectech Aero Servies to fulfill their specification of electronically dimming cabin windows. In response to the reasonable observation that Inspectech is in fact nothing more than a broker for the technology with no manufacturing capabilities of its own, promoters demanded, in effect, "well, if it isn't Inspectech and SPD, then who? Who dammit???"
That came to a crashing end yesterday on the forums. The trigger was a post by our friend Ed Wesnofske. In clarification of the most recent challenge, Ed posted a quote from Klaus Brauer, the head of interior design for the 787 project, wherein he stated that the mystery technology for the cabin windows "is in use on some business jets today and, in fact, in some lavatory windows on commercial airplanes."
While Wesnofske's source on the quote is unclear (it was described only as an "online chat"), this proved to be a vital clue. Forum poster xavierducats seized upon the new information and very quickly researched up what very much appears to be the answer to the long-standing riddle.
Meet the JAMCO luxury lavatory. It's certainly not like anything you'll find on your typical domestic flight, that's for certain. But scroll down to the bottom and -- what's this? -- a liquid crystal window that goes clear and dark at the touch of a button. Just as Brauer said.
And if that weren't enough, xavierducats followed that up by referencing the JAMCO news page, wherein JAMCO reveals a long-standing supplier relationship with Boeing, including a significant upgrade in standing for the 787 project.
So there's hardly any room for doubt at all that this is the technology Brauer had in mind with the lavatory comment. Mind you, a handful will remain in denial, as JAMCO has not yet explicitly stated that they are doing the cabin windows, but for all intents and purposes, this particular storyline is over.
But stay tuned. They'll come up with something else soon. They have to.
Thursday, June 16, 2005
Stockholder wrongs
I'm going to go slightly off-topic today in that while REFR is a participant in this particular fraud upon the investment community, they are far from alone.
It is about these so-called Stockholder Rights plans. In most cases, to be fair, the most misleading part of the whole business is the name. This is nothing about protecting the shareholders and everything about protecting the company itself, and especially, the company management.
Back in the wild and wooly days of the 1980's, corporate raids grabbed the headlines, as the likes of Carl Icahn, Irwin L. Jacobs and Henry Kravis would make "hostile takovers" of companies, effectively seizing control by buying 51% of the company, then either making wholesale changes to the company, or in some cases simply liquidating it.
The rightness or wrongness of the practice can be debated endlessly, but it all became moot with the advent of the "poison pill". Without going into details, what it amounts to is an emergency clause that permits the board of directors to issue new shares to dilute any attempt at consolidation of a 51% position, long before anyone can get close to such a level. Of course, the board can waive the clause at will, thus still permitting "friendly" buyouts.
The bottom line for all of this, as far as REFR shareholders are concerned, is that the "shareholder rights" plan gives them the right to be stuck with the same management, which has ripped them off for four decades, for as long as they can continue to raise new funds to keep it going.
And that's just wrong.
It is about these so-called Stockholder Rights plans. In most cases, to be fair, the most misleading part of the whole business is the name. This is nothing about protecting the shareholders and everything about protecting the company itself, and especially, the company management.
Back in the wild and wooly days of the 1980's, corporate raids grabbed the headlines, as the likes of Carl Icahn, Irwin L. Jacobs and Henry Kravis would make "hostile takovers" of companies, effectively seizing control by buying 51% of the company, then either making wholesale changes to the company, or in some cases simply liquidating it.
The rightness or wrongness of the practice can be debated endlessly, but it all became moot with the advent of the "poison pill". Without going into details, what it amounts to is an emergency clause that permits the board of directors to issue new shares to dilute any attempt at consolidation of a 51% position, long before anyone can get close to such a level. Of course, the board can waive the clause at will, thus still permitting "friendly" buyouts.
The bottom line for all of this, as far as REFR shareholders are concerned, is that the "shareholder rights" plan gives them the right to be stuck with the same management, which has ripped them off for four decades, for as long as they can continue to raise new funds to keep it going.
And that's just wrong.
Wednesday, June 15, 2005
More from the annual meeting
The boards' traditional source of information on the annual meeting, a very earnest fellow named Ed Wesnofske, has finally checked in and substantially backed up the initial reports.
In addition he reported some other details:
THIS JUST IN: Reports are coming in that Tadao Kurosawa retired from his post as president of Hitachi Chemical USA last February. If so, presumably it was not him at last week's meeting. Whether this means anything with respect to Hitachi's status as an SPD film producer, remains to be seen.
In addition he reported some other details:
- Attendance at the meeting was down from previous years. That squares with the marked decline in message board activity over the past few years.
- Those members of the board of directors up for renewal were duly elected. No surprise there; their hold of power on the company is solid.
- The range for the new SPD (presumably "gen 2") is 0.5%-60% transmittance. This range is actually something that has been previously claimed, only apparently this time it is a single film capable of going the entire range, rather than it being the total range covered by various formulations of the film.
- REFR is purchasing the emulsion-making equipment for its licensees to try to get some of them "over the hump". Where exactly they are getting the money to do this, was not detailed.
- Robert Saxe's cash salary did indeed decline, but this in fact was offset by an increase in stock option compensation.
THIS JUST IN: Reports are coming in that Tadao Kurosawa retired from his post as president of Hitachi Chemical USA last February. If so, presumably it was not him at last week's meeting. Whether this means anything with respect to Hitachi's status as an SPD film producer, remains to be seen.
Tuesday, June 14, 2005
On the wrong Traco
With some REFR licensees there's really little to say. Such is the case with TRACO, a fine manufacturer of replacement windows, doors and other exterior glass products, who became licensed to sell SPD just a little over two years ago.
TRACO got their obligatory big sell as a power player in the SPD industry in the subsequent Ask Joe column, and... that was pretty much the last we ever heard from the Pennsylvania company regarding SPD. Yet today they are counted about the mighty 35, the licensees which are all actively working to make REFR a huge success, whether they themselves get anything out of it or not.
Or not.
TRACO got their obligatory big sell as a power player in the SPD industry in the subsequent Ask Joe column, and... that was pretty much the last we ever heard from the Pennsylvania company regarding SPD. Yet today they are counted about the mighty 35, the licensees which are all actively working to make REFR a huge success, whether they themselves get anything out of it or not.
Or not.
Monday, June 13, 2005
Same time next year?
A report on the secret annual shareholders' meeting has finally made its way public. It comes from a new alias to the boards, and is even self-described as "sketchy", so no warranties here, but it's something to go on.
So, lacking any assurance that any chance for royalty revenue is forthcoming anytime soon, management will have no choice but to start the fundraising process all over again this summer. And with that, another increase in the authorized shares seems inevitable, as a mere million shares at a useful discount to current prices isn't going to go very far at all.
Interesting times for REFR shareholders. But I wouldn't want to live in them.
- Hitachi was present, in the form of Tadao Kurosawa, president and CEO of Hitachi Chemical USA (really, a very small subsubdivision of the famous Japanese corporation).
- Steve Abadi from Innovative glass, he of the Extreme Makeover PR attempt, was also present, and suggesting he had large orders awaiting the availability of the Gen 2 film, in a way that typically left him an out to say he never meant that.
- Hotel Technologies was also represented, most likely by Steve Belmonte.
- Both the new and old auditors showed up, presmably to reassure everyone that there was no suggestion of accounting issues. One would hope not, there being so little to actually account for here.
- Then again, who needs accounting shenanigans, when the company proceeds to announce that Joe Harary is giving himself a $50,000 bonus for raising the $5 million last winter, and the shareholders don't even bat an eye. That said, this was apparently offset by someone else's salary decreasing. It wasn't clear who was taking the cut, though most likely it would be founder Bob Saxe, who is no doubt winding down towards retirement.
- In a refreshing bow to reality, the company confessed that commercialization was taking "too long". It went on to admit that mass production was still "at least several more months, maybe much longer" away (emphasis added). But then they added a small carrot in the form of a successful test run, but subsequent reports revealed that the results were not repeatable. In a way, unrepeatable success is actually worse that consistent failure, because that makes it a lot harder to figure out what's going wrong. That's where ISO 9000 and that whole business came from.
- In the interest of completeness, I'll add that other reports later claimed the licensees were much more optimistic in private. (Funny how that works!) Some even claimed that the licensees somehow knew each others' positions relative to achieving mass production and thus who was "ahead". Of course, that begs the question of why the licensees would share that kind of information with direct competitors but not the public.
- Then in a moment that showed that some of these shareholders are just naturally unhinged, someone asked about a buyout by General Electric that would amount to over $700 million. Management, to its credit, gently dismissed the suggestion.
- The report wrapped up by mentioning some technical discussion which was not reported in detail, and a reference to an upcoming SPD display at the following week's (now this week's) Paris Air Show.
So, lacking any assurance that any chance for royalty revenue is forthcoming anytime soon, management will have no choice but to start the fundraising process all over again this summer. And with that, another increase in the authorized shares seems inevitable, as a mere million shares at a useful discount to current prices isn't going to go very far at all.
Interesting times for REFR shareholders. But I wouldn't want to live in them.
Friday, June 10, 2005
Kurosawa has left the building
REFR annual meeting update: Several sources have confirmed that Tadao Kurosawa, president and CEO of Hitachi Chemical USA Ltd., the small North American operations of Hitachi Chemical, Ltd., the minor subsidiary of Hitachi Ltd., a large corporation primarily known for electronics, was present at the annual meeting and spoke to interested shareholders in private. This is a startling development, given that he has only been in attendance at two of the last three such meetings, having missed last year's due to his son's graduation.
Further updates as they mosey on in.
Further updates as they mosey on in.
Thursday, June 09, 2005
This time last year
While we wait on the "official" report on this year's annual shareholder meeting, a quick look on the events of the last meeting 52 weeks ago.
On that day, REFR stock hit new lows -- the lows that are today's 52-week highs. (Now that's what I call a bad year.) Even worse is this opening paragraph to the initial report on the meeting as given on the message boards:
"First, no major news. Second, few new details. Third, both management and shareholders' discussion indicate everyone is waiting for the next shoe to drop viz. Hitachi, Dainippon Ink and Air Products to deliver film in scaled up sizes and amounts for the marketplace and the word soon was mentioned twice."
As opposed to today, where we have 1) no major news, 2) few new details, and 3) everyone waiting on Hitachi, Dainippon and Air Products.
Great year, guys. I hope one of the quality hedge funds showed up to give you an earful.
On that day, REFR stock hit new lows -- the lows that are today's 52-week highs. (Now that's what I call a bad year.) Even worse is this opening paragraph to the initial report on the meeting as given on the message boards:
"First, no major news. Second, few new details. Third, both management and shareholders' discussion indicate everyone is waiting for the next shoe to drop viz. Hitachi, Dainippon Ink and Air Products to deliver film in scaled up sizes and amounts for the marketplace and the word soon was mentioned twice."
As opposed to today, where we have 1) no major news, 2) few new details, and 3) everyone waiting on Hitachi, Dainippon and Air Products.
Great year, guys. I hope one of the quality hedge funds showed up to give you an earful.
A GST of hot air
One of the quirks of Dixon, everyone's favorite REFR promoter, is an inability to let go of any hope of SPD market acceptance, regardless of how thoroughly it has been shown to be a dry hole.
Such is the case with the Mercedes GST, now known as the R-Class. In particular, Dixon is stuck on one feature of the vehicle, a five-square-foot "panorama sunroof".
Ever since Setra used the term "panorama roof" to describe TopSky at the time when that feature involved SPD light control, that term has become the trigger for a knee-jerk reaction from REFR promoters. "Panorama roof"? SPD. Has to be. Can't be anything else. You have five seconds to tell me what else it could possibly be. Tick tick tick bzzzt. Sorry, you lose, I win.
Of course it's a complete waste of time to point out the fact that Mercedes already has non-SPD-based sunroof light control in its far more upscale Maybach. Because apparently that technology is so frightfully expensive that it can only go in "price is no object" vehicles like the Maybach. As opposed to the bargain price SPD sells at, you see.
And don't even try to bring up the little inconvenient fact that, by everyone's acknowledgement, nobody is producing SPD film for commerical use anywhere. And that it's only about another month before production begins on the 2006 model year vehicles, including the R-Class. I've heard of "just-in-time" delivery, but "just-in-time" R&D?
I almost hope Dixon shows up at the annual meeting to ask about the Mercedes R-Class/GST. I think by now even Smiling Joe will tell her to give it up. I doubt she'll listen to anyone else.
Such is the case with the Mercedes GST, now known as the R-Class. In particular, Dixon is stuck on one feature of the vehicle, a five-square-foot "panorama sunroof".
Ever since Setra used the term "panorama roof" to describe TopSky at the time when that feature involved SPD light control, that term has become the trigger for a knee-jerk reaction from REFR promoters. "Panorama roof"? SPD. Has to be. Can't be anything else. You have five seconds to tell me what else it could possibly be. Tick tick tick bzzzt. Sorry, you lose, I win.
Of course it's a complete waste of time to point out the fact that Mercedes already has non-SPD-based sunroof light control in its far more upscale Maybach. Because apparently that technology is so frightfully expensive that it can only go in "price is no object" vehicles like the Maybach. As opposed to the bargain price SPD sells at, you see.
And don't even try to bring up the little inconvenient fact that, by everyone's acknowledgement, nobody is producing SPD film for commerical use anywhere. And that it's only about another month before production begins on the 2006 model year vehicles, including the R-Class. I've heard of "just-in-time" delivery, but "just-in-time" R&D?
I almost hope Dixon shows up at the annual meeting to ask about the Mercedes R-Class/GST. I think by now even Smiling Joe will tell her to give it up. I doubt she'll listen to anyone else.
Wednesday, June 08, 2005
A patent answer
Our friend Dixon may have spilled the proverbial beans on the big reveal for the shareholders' meeting tomorrow.
Last week REFR added to its burgeoning (and largely worthless, by the company's own admission on its balance sheet) patent portfolio with a new addition, patent number 6,900,923. This, and I am trusting Dixon to a unusually great extent here, represents the "gen 2" SPD that has been the subject of constant hype since the shutdown of SPD Inc. Or possibly the "gen 3" film referred to somewhat cryptically on Dixon's scorecard (still up-to-date!). Or maybe it's Gen 4 or 10, or whatever.
At any rate, the other message boards are keeping mum on this for some reason, and I suspect it may be because they want to keep it as much of a "surprise" as possible. Since other sources are now downplaying the possibility of a "film availability" announcement ("There is no expectation of film availability... there never was expectation of film availability..."), the granting of a new patent is practically certain to grab at least some of the spotlight tomorrow.
Of course it goes without saying there is a big difference between an approved patent and a marketable product, as has been amply demonstrated by the hundreds of patents REFR has either been granted or acquired over the years.
But never mind that. It's party time on Long Island! Save an iced tea for me.
Last week REFR added to its burgeoning (and largely worthless, by the company's own admission on its balance sheet) patent portfolio with a new addition, patent number 6,900,923. This, and I am trusting Dixon to a unusually great extent here, represents the "gen 2" SPD that has been the subject of constant hype since the shutdown of SPD Inc. Or possibly the "gen 3" film referred to somewhat cryptically on Dixon's scorecard (still up-to-date!). Or maybe it's Gen 4 or 10, or whatever.
At any rate, the other message boards are keeping mum on this for some reason, and I suspect it may be because they want to keep it as much of a "surprise" as possible. Since other sources are now downplaying the possibility of a "film availability" announcement ("There is no expectation of film availability... there never was expectation of film availability..."), the granting of a new patent is practically certain to grab at least some of the spotlight tomorrow.
Of course it goes without saying there is a big difference between an approved patent and a marketable product, as has been amply demonstrated by the hundreds of patents REFR has either been granted or acquired over the years.
But never mind that. It's party time on Long Island! Save an iced tea for me.
Tuesday, June 07, 2005
Perfectionism or plodding?
The new excuses for delays are coming out just in time to act as a preventative against an uprising at the annual shareholder meeting. Not that such is particularly likely with the placid lot that usually shows up, but an ounce of prevention and all that.
At any rate, the new excuse, now that setbacks from SPD Inc.'s shutdown have passed their "use by" date, is that the licensees are just so gosh darn particular about making sure that the SPD they produce is perfect, and how can we ask them to deliver anything but the very best they can possibly produce?
But of course. Just ask Microsoft, who never releases anything unless it's perfect the first time. (Note to Type 3's: that's sarcasm.)
Back in the real world, if demand for SPD is as colossal as the promoters would make it seem, then surely some segment of that demand would be willing to compromise on quality in return for getting it now. But apparently the SPD demand curve doesn't work that way. It certainly begs the question of whether the issue isn't reaching "perfection" as much as "acceptability".
But not to worry, I'm sure they'll have it all sorted out in three months. Mind you, which three months, we still don't know.
At any rate, the new excuse, now that setbacks from SPD Inc.'s shutdown have passed their "use by" date, is that the licensees are just so gosh darn particular about making sure that the SPD they produce is perfect, and how can we ask them to deliver anything but the very best they can possibly produce?
But of course. Just ask Microsoft, who never releases anything unless it's perfect the first time. (Note to Type 3's: that's sarcasm.)
Back in the real world, if demand for SPD is as colossal as the promoters would make it seem, then surely some segment of that demand would be willing to compromise on quality in return for getting it now. But apparently the SPD demand curve doesn't work that way. It certainly begs the question of whether the issue isn't reaching "perfection" as much as "acceptability".
But not to worry, I'm sure they'll have it all sorted out in three months. Mind you, which three months, we still don't know.
Monday, June 06, 2005
The annual bleating
It's time once again for Research Frontiers to perform its obligations to its loyal shareholder base. No, not produce profits for them or give them useful insight into the company's inner workings (the latter inevitably induces the image of a gerbil in an exercise wheel), but rather the annual suck-up fest and blue-sky session of what might be, if management were ever inclined to do something to make any of it happen.
Welcome to the regulatorily-required Annual Shareholder Meeting.
By way of a preview of Thursday's big event, let's review the 2002 edition of the fleecing, er, meeting.
"[P]lans to foster sales of SPD-Smart™ products by having SPD demonstration products made in large quantities." We're actually off to a good start in terms of accuracy in reporting. The demo products were certainly churned out over the following couple of years. The whole "foster sales" part didn't quite pan out, mind you, but give them a star for effort.
"For example, last week Research Frontiers was featured on The Money Pit, a radio program which is carried by over 100 stations in 38 states. This week, Research Frontiers’ smart window technology is appearing on a home improvement television segment expected to be seen by over 14 million viewers." And so successful were those promotional efforts, that nobody has spoken of them since. That's something, coming from the group that still tries to recycle the Extreme Makeover debacle.
"The SPD Product Demonstration Kit ("PDK") was presented at the Annual Meeting." And went to be the runaway best-seller in the SPD industry. I'm reminded of an old story about a trick deck of cards. The seller gave an impressive minute-long sales pitch about the wonders of the deck. When the buyer got home with his deck, however, he found he could replicate the sales pitch, but that was it -- the deck was useful for nothing else. The only thing it was good for was to sell to someone else. The SPD PDK works much along the same principle. (See the lower right corner of this page to see a PDK in "action".)
"The larger SPD In-Store Display will also be produced." Rumor has it these exist, but, much as with Bigfoot, no one has ever produced photographic evidence.
"This is a highly visual technology. It’s very simple - seeing is believing." Just don't try to go beyond what you see, and you'll be quite a contented believer in SPD technology.
InspecTech Aero Service, licensed to offer SPD-Smart aircraft cabin windows, unveiled a new, portable SPD aircraft window display at Research Frontiers’ Annual Meeting. They got a lot of mileage out of this, taking it to shows all over the place, and promoting the display's presence as proof of interest by some huge company or other. Of course, nothing ever came of it, but it's the short-term hype that counts, right?
ThermoView Industries, Inc. Enough said right there. That whole business proved to be a big nothing, unless you count opportunities to sell stock.
SPD Inc. Ditto, though they had a good run of ultimately unproductive promotion before folding.
"In his address to shareholders, Robert L. Saxe gave an overview of the Company’s progress and reconfirmed that based upon projections given to Research Frontiers by several of its licensees, it was a reasonable goal to expect the Company to have its first full year of profitability in 2003." This was in fact not so much a "reconfirmation" as it was a stepping-back from the previous status of "projecting" profitability by the fourth quarter of 2002 and the full year of 2003. This little switcheroo allowed the promotional effort to later claim that management never promised anything with respect to profitability. Of course, we know what really happened.
Finally, note the "demonstration" at the bottom of the page. Notice anything funny? Yes, the room appears to get darker after the glass goes dark, but... look at the floor! It still reflects a bright day outside.
Just one more example from a company that can't seem to do anything right. We'll see what they try to come up with at Thursday's meeting.
Welcome to the regulatorily-required Annual Shareholder Meeting.
By way of a preview of Thursday's big event, let's review the 2002 edition of the fleecing, er, meeting.
"[P]lans to foster sales of SPD-Smart™ products by having SPD demonstration products made in large quantities." We're actually off to a good start in terms of accuracy in reporting. The demo products were certainly churned out over the following couple of years. The whole "foster sales" part didn't quite pan out, mind you, but give them a star for effort.
"For example, last week Research Frontiers was featured on The Money Pit, a radio program which is carried by over 100 stations in 38 states. This week, Research Frontiers’ smart window technology is appearing on a home improvement television segment expected to be seen by over 14 million viewers." And so successful were those promotional efforts, that nobody has spoken of them since. That's something, coming from the group that still tries to recycle the Extreme Makeover debacle.
"The SPD Product Demonstration Kit ("PDK") was presented at the Annual Meeting." And went to be the runaway best-seller in the SPD industry. I'm reminded of an old story about a trick deck of cards. The seller gave an impressive minute-long sales pitch about the wonders of the deck. When the buyer got home with his deck, however, he found he could replicate the sales pitch, but that was it -- the deck was useful for nothing else. The only thing it was good for was to sell to someone else. The SPD PDK works much along the same principle. (See the lower right corner of this page to see a PDK in "action".)
"The larger SPD In-Store Display will also be produced." Rumor has it these exist, but, much as with Bigfoot, no one has ever produced photographic evidence.
"This is a highly visual technology. It’s very simple - seeing is believing." Just don't try to go beyond what you see, and you'll be quite a contented believer in SPD technology.
InspecTech Aero Service, licensed to offer SPD-Smart aircraft cabin windows, unveiled a new, portable SPD aircraft window display at Research Frontiers’ Annual Meeting. They got a lot of mileage out of this, taking it to shows all over the place, and promoting the display's presence as proof of interest by some huge company or other. Of course, nothing ever came of it, but it's the short-term hype that counts, right?
ThermoView Industries, Inc. Enough said right there. That whole business proved to be a big nothing, unless you count opportunities to sell stock.
SPD Inc. Ditto, though they had a good run of ultimately unproductive promotion before folding.
"In his address to shareholders, Robert L. Saxe gave an overview of the Company’s progress and reconfirmed that based upon projections given to Research Frontiers by several of its licensees, it was a reasonable goal to expect the Company to have its first full year of profitability in 2003." This was in fact not so much a "reconfirmation" as it was a stepping-back from the previous status of "projecting" profitability by the fourth quarter of 2002 and the full year of 2003. This little switcheroo allowed the promotional effort to later claim that management never promised anything with respect to profitability. Of course, we know what really happened.
Finally, note the "demonstration" at the bottom of the page. Notice anything funny? Yes, the room appears to get darker after the glass goes dark, but... look at the floor! It still reflects a bright day outside.
Just one more example from a company that can't seem to do anything right. We'll see what they try to come up with at Thursday's meeting.
Friday, June 03, 2005
The phantom car
It's really not in the style of this blog to focus on specific anonymous message board posters. After all, there's rarely any direct proof that these are anything but earnest, if horribly deluded, people who genuinely believe what they're saying.
But every now and then, some of them cross the line, and when one does so in such a grandstanding manner it becomes hard to ignore.
Such is the case with poster "N. Dixon" of Silicon Investor, who is presumably one and the same as "N_Dixon" on the Yahoo boards, and whose writings have been the source for the bulk of this week's entries.
Dixon has been a longtime advocate of REFR on the message boards, dating back to the very early days of the Yahoo boards. Dixon, who claims the "N" stands for "Nancy" (therefore I will use feminine pronouns) claims to be an REFR shareholder dating back to 1992, which, not really surprisingly, featured some of the lowest prices at which REFR stock has traded (on a split-adjusted basis, even lower than this year's lows).
As of late, Dixon has confined herself to Silicon Investor, where she posts away with less voluminous rebuttal than she would encounter on Yahoo. The reason for this "exile" may well be what follows.
It all began with what seemed a joke. Dixon said she planned to ask, at the 2004 REFR annual shareholders meeting, "Which 2005 vehicle with SPD glass do you think is the most attractive?"
She subsequently clarified that she meant the 2005 model year.
Then she went even further: "Already picked out my SPD-Smart equipped vehicle for purchase next year."
And then later: "SPD ALREADY in 2005 production vehicles and in aircraft."
She later added that she believed that the Mercedes GST would include SPD by Spring 2005, but did not specify that this was the car she "ordered".
Dixon went on to take the show to Silicon Investor:
"I'll let you know how I like my 2005 auto with SPD glass."
"I've ordered [my vehicle with SPD]."
"SPD in production vehicles. I've ordered mine!"
Later, with the 2005 model year winding down and no source of SPD film, much less a finished product, in sight, the tale changed:
"I have ordered my car with SPD. I get updates on it. It was scheduled for manufacturing in 2005 so it might be a 2006 model."
Requests for further details, such as make and model of her order, went predictably unanswered.
So apparently we are supposed to believe that Dixon ordered a car without knowing the model year, to be manufactured more than a year later. I'd sure like to know the dealer that would take an order like that.
No, the conclusion is unavoidable that the whole tale of an order of a 2005 model year automobile was quite simply made up out of thin air. And it seems likely than, rather than have to face a derisive mob anytime she attempted to say anything, Dixon retreated to relatively calm waters of SI, where no more than two or three people will be pestering her about it at any given point in time.
Rumors that Dixon has verbally denied being a crook, meanwhile, remain unconfirmed.
But every now and then, some of them cross the line, and when one does so in such a grandstanding manner it becomes hard to ignore.
Such is the case with poster "N. Dixon" of Silicon Investor, who is presumably one and the same as "N_Dixon" on the Yahoo boards, and whose writings have been the source for the bulk of this week's entries.
Dixon has been a longtime advocate of REFR on the message boards, dating back to the very early days of the Yahoo boards. Dixon, who claims the "N" stands for "Nancy" (therefore I will use feminine pronouns) claims to be an REFR shareholder dating back to 1992, which, not really surprisingly, featured some of the lowest prices at which REFR stock has traded (on a split-adjusted basis, even lower than this year's lows).
As of late, Dixon has confined herself to Silicon Investor, where she posts away with less voluminous rebuttal than she would encounter on Yahoo. The reason for this "exile" may well be what follows.
It all began with what seemed a joke. Dixon said she planned to ask, at the 2004 REFR annual shareholders meeting, "Which 2005 vehicle with SPD glass do you think is the most attractive?"
She subsequently clarified that she meant the 2005 model year.
Then she went even further: "Already picked out my SPD-Smart equipped vehicle for purchase next year."
And then later: "SPD ALREADY in 2005 production vehicles and in aircraft."
She later added that she believed that the Mercedes GST would include SPD by Spring 2005, but did not specify that this was the car she "ordered".
Dixon went on to take the show to Silicon Investor:
"I'll let you know how I like my 2005 auto with SPD glass."
"I've ordered [my vehicle with SPD]."
"SPD in production vehicles. I've ordered mine!"
Later, with the 2005 model year winding down and no source of SPD film, much less a finished product, in sight, the tale changed:
"I have ordered my car with SPD. I get updates on it. It was scheduled for manufacturing in 2005 so it might be a 2006 model."
Requests for further details, such as make and model of her order, went predictably unanswered.
So apparently we are supposed to believe that Dixon ordered a car without knowing the model year, to be manufactured more than a year later. I'd sure like to know the dealer that would take an order like that.
No, the conclusion is unavoidable that the whole tale of an order of a 2005 model year automobile was quite simply made up out of thin air. And it seems likely than, rather than have to face a derisive mob anytime she attempted to say anything, Dixon retreated to relatively calm waters of SI, where no more than two or three people will be pestering her about it at any given point in time.
Rumors that Dixon has verbally denied being a crook, meanwhile, remain unconfirmed.
Thursday, June 02, 2005
A real Hitachi job
Anyway, picking up where we left off, REFR president Joe Harary was telling a theoretically international audience:
But this is no case of "something went wrong". This is a case of "something was wrong", as in, Harary all but had to have known that the above prediction would not come to pass, and that he in fact had no reason to "expect" any such thing.
Consider this quote from an email dated 1/20/05, more than two months after the Harary Glasstec interview, from Tadao Kurosawa, president and CEO of REFR licensee Hitachi Chemical:
"....Hitachi Chemical Ltd. is one of RFI licensee for SPD emlusion and Film. They have just installed all equipment for SPD coating pilot line in one of our facilities in Japan. And they are trying to coat SPD film as test-run. I do not know exactly how long to take a time for this test -run, two,three months. I hope this test run will be done succesfully not so taking a time. After this completion we will start sampling our SPD film to RFI licensees. This is our current status for SPD project."
Mediocre English notwithstanding, the implication is clear: at the time Harary gave that interview and made the above statement, Hitachi, by all accounts the lead company as far as establishing a source for "next generation" SPD film, did not even have equipment installed for testing purposes(!) Given Kurosawa's additional admission that test runs tend to take months, and it becomes absolutely clear that Harary's January timeframe was entirely unattainable based on information Harary himself had easy access to and quite simply should have known.
You want to get snowed... Ask Joe.
"We expect that the next generation film will be available in mass production starting in January 2005."It is now June, and this has still not happened.
But this is no case of "something went wrong". This is a case of "something was wrong", as in, Harary all but had to have known that the above prediction would not come to pass, and that he in fact had no reason to "expect" any such thing.
Consider this quote from an email dated 1/20/05, more than two months after the Harary Glasstec interview, from Tadao Kurosawa, president and CEO of REFR licensee Hitachi Chemical:
"....Hitachi Chemical Ltd. is one of RFI licensee for SPD emlusion and Film. They have just installed all equipment for SPD coating pilot line in one of our facilities in Japan. And they are trying to coat SPD film as test-run. I do not know exactly how long to take a time for this test -run, two,three months. I hope this test run will be done succesfully not so taking a time. After this completion we will start sampling our SPD film to RFI licensees. This is our current status for SPD project."
Mediocre English notwithstanding, the implication is clear: at the time Harary gave that interview and made the above statement, Hitachi, by all accounts the lead company as far as establishing a source for "next generation" SPD film, did not even have equipment installed for testing purposes(!) Given Kurosawa's additional admission that test runs tend to take months, and it becomes absolutely clear that Harary's January timeframe was entirely unattainable based on information Harary himself had easy access to and quite simply should have known.
You want to get snowed... Ask Joe.
Good questions!
I'll finish up the Glasstec thing hopefully later today (it's short, no worries), but while it's on my mind, I wanted to highlight an excellent post containing some extremely valid questions a REFR shareholder might want to ask at this year's annual meeting, and maybe toss in my two cents on what the answers are or should be.
The point of this sorry little tale being, it's really too late to go back anyway. Who would want to buy film that the company has publicly admitted to be flawed? Particularly at the exorbitant prices being charged.
But then again, I'm not a type 3 investor. Nor is our question-asker, I suspect.
"Why are we waiting for generation 2 of SPD before licensees are selling product?"I can answer that one: it's because if someone started selling "1st generation" SPD at this point, it would call into question the whole reason why SPD Inc. folded last year. The current company line is that it was considered foolish to continue selling "gen 1" SPD with the imminent introduction of "gen 2". Of course, "gen 2" proved to be not so imminent after all, but so far REFR has been reasonably succesful in ignoring that fact. A licensee reversing and re-opening the market for "gen 1" film would be a distinct embarassment and might even suggest that there were problems with "gen 2". Definitely not the message REFR wants to send right now.
"Why wasn't a marketplace established with generation 1 in order to a) kick off the market, b) get some maket awareness, c) start people using generation 1 in real world uses, d) start getting feedback from the market on the pros and cons of the product?"The promoters would argue that precisely this was done, with the various photographed installations supplying the proof. Of course, real shareholders would probably want to see substance in the form of some measure of ubiquity instead of isolated instances that are not too many to individually document on a web page. But I guess "everywhere you look(tm)" means different things to different people.
"Most companies learn from their first generation product and refine it in the next generation. It seems like we have lost years since I heard Robert Saxe say that the next year may be our first profitable year. Why wouldn't the licensees sell what was available to let the world know SPD exists and will be getting better?"At the company I worked for a little over a decade ago, we had just put the finishing touches on a fine little product that would have served its target market well for years, while we worked on the next-generation product. But then our head of marketing got wind of the new development, and started hyping it to his customers. This, to his shock and surprise, killed sales of the product we had just finished, as customers unanimously elected to hold off until the new product was ready, and turned R&D's life into a living hell for two years as the company struggled to rush the new product through the design and development process.
The point of this sorry little tale being, it's really too late to go back anyway. Who would want to buy film that the company has publicly admitted to be flawed? Particularly at the exorbitant prices being charged.
"We lost all that potential product ramp up time to get potential buyers ready to go. Why won't this happen to the generation 2 product? Why aren't we going to wait until generation 3?"In short, what's to stop all this from happening all over again? The simple and obvious answer is, "nothing, of course". The promoters' response will be to get all upset that someone dares to look in the "rear-view mirror" for a clue as to what might happen in the future.
"Some of us longs are real loooong loooongs who believe in the product but I am confused why generation 1 hasn't started us up."And that's a point that's really unanswerable. Early versions of products, especially in the computer industry, may have been pretty weak compared to their present-day forms, but they had sales. People bought the IBM PCjr. People bought 128K Macs. People bought Newtons. Unfortunately, the same simply cannot be said for "gen 1" SPD. How anyone can take that as a good sign for the future is beyond me.
But then again, I'm not a type 3 investor. Nor is our question-asker, I suspect.
Wednesday, June 01, 2005
Glasstec and the four-month (and counting) gap
Today, another item from the N. Dixon files. (In light of current events, I think maybe I should be calling myself Threep Doat.)
This one is one that I am frankly surprised that REFR's promoters would be willing to still bring up, given what it contains.
The item in question is a videotaped interview Joe Harary gave at the Glasstec industry show last November. This is a direct link to the Windows Media file recording of that interview.
There are three main highlights to the short presentation.
The first is the inevitable demonstration of SPD in action. This, I am certain, has been practiced many times so it is little surprise that it comes off flawlessly. If there is one thing REFR knows how to do, it is demos.
Somewhere near the midpoint of the interview, Harary references a study indicating a growth rate in the demand for "smart glass" over a five-year period. What Harary "forgets" to mention is, the study, and therefore, the beginning of the five-year period, was in 2000, so that in fact the growth he was citing had already occurred. And poor SPD got left out.
The final highlight was towards the end of the interview. The inevitable question of when this fantastic SPD technology would be available arose. Harary, in typical hedging fashion, suggested January as a likely date.
Well, it is now June and next-generation SPD is nowhere to be found. (High hopes remain that a big announcement is being saved for this year's annual shareholder meeting; we'll see.) But worse than that, evidence subsequently arose that indicates that Harary almost certainly knew that a January time frame was an impossibility at the time he gave that interview.
More tomorrow!
This one is one that I am frankly surprised that REFR's promoters would be willing to still bring up, given what it contains.
The item in question is a videotaped interview Joe Harary gave at the Glasstec industry show last November. This is a direct link to the Windows Media file recording of that interview.
There are three main highlights to the short presentation.
The first is the inevitable demonstration of SPD in action. This, I am certain, has been practiced many times so it is little surprise that it comes off flawlessly. If there is one thing REFR knows how to do, it is demos.
Somewhere near the midpoint of the interview, Harary references a study indicating a growth rate in the demand for "smart glass" over a five-year period. What Harary "forgets" to mention is, the study, and therefore, the beginning of the five-year period, was in 2000, so that in fact the growth he was citing had already occurred. And poor SPD got left out.
The final highlight was towards the end of the interview. The inevitable question of when this fantastic SPD technology would be available arose. Harary, in typical hedging fashion, suggested January as a likely date.
Well, it is now June and next-generation SPD is nowhere to be found. (High hopes remain that a big announcement is being saved for this year's annual shareholder meeting; we'll see.) But worse than that, evidence subsequently arose that indicates that Harary almost certainly knew that a January time frame was an impossibility at the time he gave that interview.
More tomorrow!
Tuesday, May 31, 2005
Why isn't the (Top)sky blue?
I generally try to limit my postings here to one per weekday so that I don't cross the line into obsession or burnout, but occasionally something will stand out as obnoxious enough that I feel the need to get to it right away. (Besides which, I may not have time for an update tomorrow).
Our good friend Dixon, whom we just met earlier today, is flogging the cover story in the June 2005 issue of BUSRide magazine, which makes significant mention of the Setra S 417, a bus which, among other features, includes a transparent "panorama" roof under the branding of TopSky.
I mentioned TopSky way back in the early days of this blog as REFR and SPD's closest flirtation with legitimacy in the marketplace. The version shown back then had an automatic dimming feature which employed SPD technology. After a couple of months, the whole business faded away, and the supplier of SPD for Setra, SPD Inc., shut down.
Now, it's well-established that, despite allegedly promising noises that the new generation of SPD suppliers are well into the testing phase of SPD production runs, no company is actually producing SPD film on a commerical basis at this time. So how, one might ask, can Setra be making busses with the TopSky feature, without any SPD film available?
The answer is simple. TopSky is, and always was, about the roof itself, not any dimming capability. And it seems to be turning out that bus passengers are quite happy with the transparent roof even without the ability to vary the tinting.
In short, Setra, and its parent, Daimler-Chrysler, are getting along just fine without the assistance of the SPD "industry", and the BUSRide article, much as Dixon seems to believe otherwise, only helps to prove it.
Better luck next time.
Our good friend Dixon, whom we just met earlier today, is flogging the cover story in the June 2005 issue of BUSRide magazine, which makes significant mention of the Setra S 417, a bus which, among other features, includes a transparent "panorama" roof under the branding of TopSky.
I mentioned TopSky way back in the early days of this blog as REFR and SPD's closest flirtation with legitimacy in the marketplace. The version shown back then had an automatic dimming feature which employed SPD technology. After a couple of months, the whole business faded away, and the supplier of SPD for Setra, SPD Inc., shut down.
Now, it's well-established that, despite allegedly promising noises that the new generation of SPD suppliers are well into the testing phase of SPD production runs, no company is actually producing SPD film on a commerical basis at this time. So how, one might ask, can Setra be making busses with the TopSky feature, without any SPD film available?
The answer is simple. TopSky is, and always was, about the roof itself, not any dimming capability. And it seems to be turning out that bus passengers are quite happy with the transparent roof even without the ability to vary the tinting.
In short, Setra, and its parent, Daimler-Chrysler, are getting along just fine without the assistance of the SPD "industry", and the BUSRide article, much as Dixon seems to believe otherwise, only helps to prove it.
Better luck next time.
In Search Of: the point
The Yahoo! REFR board, REFR's primary promotional outlet over the past year, did the almost unthinkable and actually took much of the holiday weekend off.
Not everyone was enjoying the three-day respite, however. The person posting as "N. Dixon" on Silicon Investor (a name I can't read without thinking in spoonerism terms) was apparently quite hard at work, compiling a voluminous series of postings, in order to prove... well, a point, I guess. I'm really not sure, maybe this person is trying to amass a volume of positive data to counter this admittedly mostly-negative collection of observations about REFR.
At any rate, it's a fine source of material for me, as one of my goals with this blog is to exhaustively look into every bullish argument that has been hoisted to convince investors this company is something other than what it is, a method of transferring wealth from shareholders to company management.
Some of the items Dixon posted yesterday have been covered already, and several others are just echoes of the company line disguised as independent observations.
A few, though, have me scratching my head and wondering just what possible point Dixon could have in mind.
Consider this post: TWO SPD LICENSES[sic] WORKING TOGETHER!!!!
Now, you can look as hard as you like through that post, but you won't see anything about SPD. I guess the theory is that because DuPont holds an SPD license, and Isoclima holds an SPD license, and because they're working together on something, that must mean... I don't know, that maybe the topic of SPD comes up at lunch? Who knows?
(By the way, for those of you complaining that this blog doesn't accept on-site replies, please note that I do read the Yahoo and SI message boards and you are more than welcome to post your comments there. If someone comes up with a sane explanation of the thought process here, I'll be sure to post it.)
What makes this all the more bizarre is that the post is not, in fact, a single press release at all, but actually an amalgamation of a press release and a case study on the DuPont website. The case study is the part that shows DuPont and Isoclima "working together" (though clearly stating in a subsequent paragraph that the material being used is PVB, not SPD). The only reason I can think of for splashing the segment of the press release at the top is for the headline, New DuPont Technology Gives Auto Safety Glass a New "Look", which, if one never bothered to read past it or look at the pictures, might leave one with the impression that SPD could be involved.
So, the bottom line, Dixon has somehow managed to say absolutely nothing and yet still be transparently dishonest. I have to admit, that takes some talent.
More on this source in the days to come.
Not everyone was enjoying the three-day respite, however. The person posting as "N. Dixon" on Silicon Investor (a name I can't read without thinking in spoonerism terms) was apparently quite hard at work, compiling a voluminous series of postings, in order to prove... well, a point, I guess. I'm really not sure, maybe this person is trying to amass a volume of positive data to counter this admittedly mostly-negative collection of observations about REFR.
At any rate, it's a fine source of material for me, as one of my goals with this blog is to exhaustively look into every bullish argument that has been hoisted to convince investors this company is something other than what it is, a method of transferring wealth from shareholders to company management.
Some of the items Dixon posted yesterday have been covered already, and several others are just echoes of the company line disguised as independent observations.
A few, though, have me scratching my head and wondering just what possible point Dixon could have in mind.
Consider this post: TWO SPD LICENSES[sic] WORKING TOGETHER!!!!
Now, you can look as hard as you like through that post, but you won't see anything about SPD. I guess the theory is that because DuPont holds an SPD license, and Isoclima holds an SPD license, and because they're working together on something, that must mean... I don't know, that maybe the topic of SPD comes up at lunch? Who knows?
(By the way, for those of you complaining that this blog doesn't accept on-site replies, please note that I do read the Yahoo and SI message boards and you are more than welcome to post your comments there. If someone comes up with a sane explanation of the thought process here, I'll be sure to post it.)
What makes this all the more bizarre is that the post is not, in fact, a single press release at all, but actually an amalgamation of a press release and a case study on the DuPont website. The case study is the part that shows DuPont and Isoclima "working together" (though clearly stating in a subsequent paragraph that the material being used is PVB, not SPD). The only reason I can think of for splashing the segment of the press release at the top is for the headline, New DuPont Technology Gives Auto Safety Glass a New "Look", which, if one never bothered to read past it or look at the pictures, might leave one with the impression that SPD could be involved.
So, the bottom line, Dixon has somehow managed to say absolutely nothing and yet still be transparently dishonest. I have to admit, that takes some talent.
More on this source in the days to come.
Friday, May 27, 2005
Someone stop me before I blog again!
The reviews are in!
However, all joking aside, I thought I would address a few serious criticisms brought up, relating to facts I've supposedly gotten wrong.
"REFR "strangely got no share of proceeds" from liquidation of SPDi. Entirely false, just read freely available documents."
The information was correct based upon information I had at the time. Subsequent new information was later noted.
"Victor Keen is on the payroll. At his law firm, not REFR."
Apparently we are supposed to believe Corporate Secretary is an unpaid position. You may believe that if you like, but I don't.
"Management has no profit incentive. What do you call all those shares they own?"
Hmm, the term "chicken feed" comes to mind for some reason. But seriously, they're practially obliged to hold some reasonable number of shares. There would simply be no case for anyone to buy the stock at all without that factor, and then how would they get financing for their next year of salaries?
"Visits to THV spots after intro of alter-lite window found no SPD product on display. Absolute lie. Comments of THV shareholder on the display were posted here."
This appears to be a valid correction, as far as it goes. At the same time, however, it was noted that Thermoview does virtually all of its sales over the phone rather than in-person at their stores, so an in-store display was not especially valuable.
"REFR does nothing to market SPD products. What does this liar think Mike LaPointe does? Write a blog that no one reads?"
Ah, I can feel the love. What Mike LaPointe does is market REFR stock, so if you want to call that a product then you may have a point. He'll also give a spiel (albeit sometimes an outdated one) to anyone who will print it free.
"Joe's motive is his salary. Yeah right. A guy with his Ivy League credentials could make at least a million bucks a year more with less aggravation at a New York law firm."
Yeah, but at the law firm he'd actually have to do things for people. I don't see at all what's "aggravating" about his job at REFR, unless you really don't like travelling around the country and the world at shareholder expense. Certainly the people who are ultimately paying him at REFR are a lot more understanding than your average legal client would be.
Additionally, claiming that these guys can pull down a million a year anytime they feel like it rather bears out my "chicken feed" remark, above.
There is something suspicious about IAS doing the roof for the Jeep Rescue (oooh shades of Soulard).
You're right, what was I thinking? There was nothing at all to worries that SPD Inc. might shut down.
Sjuan2 has no doubt changed his ID and starting posting under a new alias. More BS with no evidence.
The alternative would be that he got fed up with REFR's broken promises and walked away. I'd think you'd prefer my first explanation.
Memo to blogger, if you ever found out who you are trying to portray as a complete idiot, you might actually feel embarrassed.
From what I know of the REFR message board posters, most of them would rather die than let their identities be known. I'll let the reader decide who's actually embarrassed here.
"you really need to GET A LIFE!.....you freakin' loser." -- raftman007
"Every blog I have ever seen allows readers to comment. Why doesn't yours? ...That sort of tactic has had a name long before your cowardly effort came along. It is known as yellow journalism." -- kahler_manifold2Oh, yeah, there was some positive feedback as well, but that's not as much fun. I thought the Pulitzer nomination was a bit over the top anyhow.
This crap is so far outside the range of normal human behavior that you should be under professional care and observation....24 hours per day. You are in danger of doing something really dangerous to yourself or others." -- harvardbillpayer
However, all joking aside, I thought I would address a few serious criticisms brought up, relating to facts I've supposedly gotten wrong.
"REFR "strangely got no share of proceeds" from liquidation of SPDi. Entirely false, just read freely available documents."
The information was correct based upon information I had at the time. Subsequent new information was later noted.
"Victor Keen is on the payroll. At his law firm, not REFR."
Apparently we are supposed to believe Corporate Secretary is an unpaid position. You may believe that if you like, but I don't.
"Management has no profit incentive. What do you call all those shares they own?"
Hmm, the term "chicken feed" comes to mind for some reason. But seriously, they're practially obliged to hold some reasonable number of shares. There would simply be no case for anyone to buy the stock at all without that factor, and then how would they get financing for their next year of salaries?
"Visits to THV spots after intro of alter-lite window found no SPD product on display. Absolute lie. Comments of THV shareholder on the display were posted here."
This appears to be a valid correction, as far as it goes. At the same time, however, it was noted that Thermoview does virtually all of its sales over the phone rather than in-person at their stores, so an in-store display was not especially valuable.
"REFR does nothing to market SPD products. What does this liar think Mike LaPointe does? Write a blog that no one reads?"
Ah, I can feel the love. What Mike LaPointe does is market REFR stock, so if you want to call that a product then you may have a point. He'll also give a spiel (albeit sometimes an outdated one) to anyone who will print it free.
"Joe's motive is his salary. Yeah right. A guy with his Ivy League credentials could make at least a million bucks a year more with less aggravation at a New York law firm."
Yeah, but at the law firm he'd actually have to do things for people. I don't see at all what's "aggravating" about his job at REFR, unless you really don't like travelling around the country and the world at shareholder expense. Certainly the people who are ultimately paying him at REFR are a lot more understanding than your average legal client would be.
Additionally, claiming that these guys can pull down a million a year anytime they feel like it rather bears out my "chicken feed" remark, above.
There is something suspicious about IAS doing the roof for the Jeep Rescue (oooh shades of Soulard).
You're right, what was I thinking? There was nothing at all to worries that SPD Inc. might shut down.
Sjuan2 has no doubt changed his ID and starting posting under a new alias. More BS with no evidence.
The alternative would be that he got fed up with REFR's broken promises and walked away. I'd think you'd prefer my first explanation.
Memo to blogger, if you ever found out who you are trying to portray as a complete idiot, you might actually feel embarrassed.
From what I know of the REFR message board posters, most of them would rather die than let their identities be known. I'll let the reader decide who's actually embarrassed here.
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